

CURRENT *History*

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Coming Next Month

LABOR-MANAGEMENT:

THE STORY OF THE FEDERAL ROLE

Our June, 1965, issue will be the first of a three-issue set which *Current History* plans to devote to a study-in-depth of labor-management—past and present—in the United States. This introductory issue will offer a historical overview of the federal government's role in this important area of human relations.

The Federal Role: Its Constitutional Authority

by PAUL MURPHY, Professor of History, University of Minnesota;

The Effect of the Rise of Modern Industry: 1850-1933

by GERALD D. NASH, Associate Professor of History, University of New Mexico;

The Effect of the Trade Union Movement: 1850-1933

by ALBERT A. BLUM, Professor in the School of Labor and Industrial Relations, Michigan State University;

The New Deal Period

by JEROLD S. AUERBACH, Professor of History, Queens College;

The World War II Years

by MILTON DERBER, Professor of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Illinois;

Post-World War II Legislation

by JOSEPH P. GOLDBERG, Special Assistant to the Commissioner, U.S. Department of Labor.

Also Coming . . .

LABOR-MANAGEMENT: ITS CONTINUING ROLE,
July, 1965

LABOR-MANAGEMENT IN THE GREAT SOCIETY,
August, 1965

HIGH SCHOOL DEBATERS: Note these 3 issues on the 1965-66 N.U.E.A. DEBATE TOPIC.

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CURRENT History

MAY, 1965

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In this issue, seven specialists examine the Middle East area, evaluating the strengths, weaknesses and policies of various nations there. Our introductory article explores United States policy in the Middle East, concluding that "In retrospect, since the United States found it necessary, not long after the close of World War II, to assume the principal Western responsibility for the maintenance of a tolerably secure situation in the Middle East, its policy has evolved through successive stages," from containment to deterrence and, finally, to "a large measure of laissez-faire."

The U. S. in the Middle East: Policy in Transition

By HALFORD L. HOSKINS

Professor of Middle East Studies, The American University

UNITED STATES POLICY relative to the Middle East can be set forth only in general terms. Considered in detail, it appears to lose consistency, for in detail it is *ad hoc* policy. It can be said with assurance only that the United States seeks the stability, growing prosperity and general welfare of the countries of this area—for the sake of improved living conditions for their populations, for their better functioning as members of the international community, and hence for the greater assurance of world peace and security. These broad lines of policy for the Middle East are much the same as those applicable to any other part of the world, inasmuch as the orientation of the nation with respect to any segment of the globe must be reasonably consistent with its foreign policy generally.

Beyond such generalities, the defining of

policy lines becomes appreciably more difficult. With particular reference to the Middle East, difficulty arises in part from the fact that the United States has had direct and acknowledged responsibilities in that area—Independent of the long-established interests of Great Britain and France—for only a relatively short period of time; in part because of rapidly changing conditions not only within the area itself but also in the world at large.

Nevertheless, it is possible to resolve the initial broad definition of United States policy for the Middle East into somewhat more specific and practical terms without loss of consistency, albeit with some sacrifice of idealistic tone. Thus it can be said that in pursuing the aim of contributing to the welfare of the peoples of the Middle East, the United States has desired to encourage their mutual cooperation and friendly relations with na-

tions of the so-called free world to counteract doctrines—such as communism—believed to be fundamentally unsound and harmful. This is intended to promote—not too incidentally—attitudes in keeping with United States interests which, in the Middle East, stem from a base of security.

It is in the implementing of these policy aims that overall objectives not infrequently are lost from view. United States interests are not spread evenly over the area; they are not always compatible; and they do not invariably mesh with the forces at work in the Middle East countries themselves. Moreover, changing emphasis in foreign policy is implicit in the continual shrinking of time-distances, in estimates of the relative strength and preparedness of the principal power blocs, and even in the shifting attitudes of the American people toward issues in the field of international relations. Since some elements of foreign policy may never be made explicit in official word and deed, an appraisal of United States policy for the Middle East requires a review of public attitude on foreign issues and situations as reported in the press plus an analysis of addresses, pronouncements and press conferences of the President and members of his entourage, resolutions and enabling legislation of the Congress, and governmental response in terms of action or lack of action as specific questions arise in the area.

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

As has been indicated, the principal concern of the United States for the Middle East is associated broadly with security considerations. The countries of that area, in a strategic sense, are peculiarly situated. Taken together, they form a kind of corridor linking the three continents of Europe, Asia and Africa, in one dimension; in another, they lie athwart the natural routes of passage by water, by land or by air between the two great human concentrations in the West and in the East. In time of peace and under license of one kind or another, ships bearing passengers, mails and commercial goods may pass in transit through the Middle East corridor and air vehicles may move through its

airspace. The potentials possessed by states of the area for closing off lines of communication and transportation essential to the normal activity of Western nations and probably vital to Western security naturally figure prominently in the calculations of Western policy-makers, not least those of the United States. Such calculations cannot fail to arrive at the conclusion that a first requisite of policy is to make as certain as possible that no part of the Middle East should come under the control of forces hostile to the West.

Bound up in these calculations, of course, is the petroleum factor. Within the Middle East are underground reservoirs of oil containing possibly two-thirds of the world's petroleum reserves. Although the Middle East (excluding North Africa) has supplied a progressively smaller proportion of the oil and oil products consumed by members of the European Economic Community in each of the past six years, it still provides over half of Western Europe's oil imports and so remains an important energy source outside the Communist bloc. At the present time, there is no likelihood that oil will be produced elsewhere at such moderate cost as greatly to reduce the international significance of Middle East oil.

It has been almost 20 years since countries of the West began to realize that their security, briefly considered assured at the close of World War II, was again threatened. Once the evidence became indisputable that, in keeping with Marxist doctrine, the Soviet Union was intent on bringing the entire non-Communist world under Communist—that is, Soviet—control, the United States manifested a willingness to extend its sphere of direct concern to meet the security need in an area previously guarded by the powers of Western Europe, particularly Great Britain. In 1947, as the Soviet Union applied pressure to Greece, Turkey and Iran, the United States gave aid and support to these countries, all of which subsequently entered into defensive arrangements with the Western powers.

In this fashion a nineteenth century political principle was revived and newly designated the "doctrine of containment." As embarked upon by the United States, this

reflected two ideas then prevalent in Western countries. One was the belief that communism was basically incompatible with Islamic thought and institutions and hence would be resisted when encountered in the Middle East. The other was the view that the postwar world recognized and accepted the continuation of Western hegemony in the Middle East.

In the light of these assumptions, both of which proved to be questionable, the architects of American foreign policy considered that the principal danger to be apprehended was overt Soviet aggression. The Korean situation in and after 1950 tended to reinforce this view. A politico-military barrier, based on some form of mutual security and bolstered by foreign aid, was regarded as the logical Middle East counterpart of the North Atlantic Treaty defense system for Western Europe. In keeping with this plan, Turkey and Greece were admitted to NATO in February, 1952. At the latitude of Istanbul, the barrier jointly maintained by fourteen states then extended three-fifths of the distance around the globe. Supporting the eastern end of this structure and presumably laying the groundwork for a Middle East defense pact was a multifaceted program of United States foreign aid which included almost the whole of the Middle East area.

Plans for a Middle East defense pact, however, did not materialize. Proposals for a Middle East Command in 1951 and for a Middle East Defense Organization in 1952 and 1953 failed utterly, owing mainly to Egyptian intransigence. By the time the "northern tier" concept had begun to take shape in 1954 and 1955, the shortcomings of containment, as a form of insurance for peace and security, already were becoming patent. The containment principle, however, was never wholly discarded. Traces of the idea still can be found in United States policy for the Middle East.

The setting up of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 gave the advocates of containment a brief sense of having achieved security. In September, the Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms deal clearly demonstrated how premature and illusory was a feeling of confidence based

solely on the inhibiting of overt aggression. The Soviet Union, having come to possess recognizable interests in the area, launched an attack against the Western powers shortly afterward. The Soviets asserted that, in attempting to control an arms race between the Arab states and Israel, the West had encroached upon the independence of these states and upon the "principles and aims" of the United Nations Charter. The Soviet pronouncement, stating in substance that in the future the U.S.S.R. proposed to be included in any arrangements of the powers relative to the Middle East, met no official challenge from the West. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that "any genuine Soviet desire to support and back up the United Nations . . . would, of course, be welcomed by the United States."

The conditional acceptance of the Soviet Union as a working partner in the United Nations signified a modification and not an abandonment of previous policy. The modification became necessary because of the United States refusal (July 19, 1956) to proceed with previously indicated financial assistance for the building of Egypt's Aswan High Dam. Our reluctant willingness to cooperate with the Soviet Union in the United Nations in an effort to halt the attempt of Britain and France to counteract Egypt's nationalizing of Suez Canal operations forcibly, ended the uniform stand of the Western powers on Middle East issues. Thereafter, Western responsibilities in this area devolved almost wholly upon the United States.

This shift in overall supervision took place at a time when the outlook for Western interests in parts of the Middle East had been deteriorating quite independent of the Suez Canal question. The Balkan Pact, concluded in 1953, had lost all momentum. The Baghdad Pact, the "northern tier" bulwark, was something less than a tower of strength. Serious economic strains had developed in Turkey, a key state in the Western alliance system. In February, 1956, Iraq had joined seven other members of the Arab League in opposing a settlement of the Arab-Israeli con-

troversy. These unpromising manifestations, coupled with signs of dissolution in Jordan and indications of Communist strength in Syria and Egypt, were patently beyond the scope of remedial action by the United Nations. The United States was confronted with situations that unmistakably called for a more dynamic policy if the Middle East were to be considered "safe."

CONTAINMENT

The first sign of a new approach to Middle East questions, suggestive of a return from dependence on the United Nations to direct action, was contained in a statement issued by the Department of State on November 27, 1956, reaffirming support for the independence of the Baghdad Pact nations on the part of the United States. This served as the prelude to the Eisenhower Doctrine. In an address to the Congress on January 5, 1957, President Dwight Eisenhower emphasized the containment concept as the basis for security in the non-Communist world. In essence, he asked the Congress, in a Joint Resolution, to provide a mandate for the use of United States armed forces at the President's discretion, on request from a state or states in the general area of the Middle East, to oppose overt aggression by any Communist or Communist-dominated country, and to authorize a special program of economic aid to the countries of the Middle East as a means of counteracting Communist propaganda and subversion.

What the President clearly desired, in the main, was the moral strength inherent in expressed congressional approval of a policy formula. Moreover, in view of the attitude of the Soviet Union during the Suez crisis, including its threat to dispatch "volunteers" to aid the Egyptian cause, it may have appeared wise to give warning to foe and friend alike that the United States was prepared to use force to repel aggression in the Middle East.

Early in 1957, the appearance of the United States Sixth Fleet at Beirut, the port and capital of the only Arab state that had officially endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine, may

have contributed to the survival of Jordan. The problems that subsequently confronted the United States in the Middle East were no less consequential than the one represented by Jordan, but they appeared in forms to which the Doctrine did not apply. In Lebanon, early in 1958, a situation arose that called for action. While there were indications of an effort to apply the Eisenhower formula, there was a further and not overly subtle intimation in the remarks of Secretary of State Dulles on May 20 that the Eisenhower Doctrine was not the sum total of United States policy for the Middle East. When "vital" interests were involved, he said, "there are a number of areas of possible action if the situation calls for it."

INTERVENTION IN LEBANON

The obvious limitations in the Eisenhower pronouncement did not appear to handicap preparations for intervention in Lebanon. Although it was recognized that direct intervention without the sanction of the United Nations might raise some of the issues involved in the application of force by Great Britain and France in connection with the Suez problem, it was considered that the risks of intervention were offset by other and greater risks that would be encountered through a failure to check Communist subversion. The upshot of failure to act in accordance with United States policy as then defined might, it was thought, be the beginning of an eventual withdrawal to "fortress America."

Whatever may be the verdict of history as to the wisdom of placing United States armed forces on Lebanese soil in 1958, the fact is worth noting that the views set forth at the United Nations in August by the Arab states themselves facilitated the removal of American and British forces from Lebanon and Jordan, brought out the merits of non-alignment relative to great-power issues, and promoted an air of disengagement in relations between the United States and the Arab Middle East. It was this change in relationships that carried over from the Eisenhower administration into the subsequent adminis-

trations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson.

"WINDS OF CHANGE"

Other forces of an uncalculated nature were exerting influence in the same direction. Advances in military technology have certainly been prominent among the major aids to deterrence in the employment of military power in pursuit of international objectives. The rapidly growing range of missiles capable of bearing atomic warheads and of reaching practically any target on earth from fixed points in North America or from movable surface or subsurface vessels at sea, the speed and sophistication of manned air vehicles, and the extension of strategic planning into the reaches of outer space have revolutionized concepts of defense and offense with inevitable side effects on foreign policy. These developments, while not yet fully comprehended, tend to reduce the need for close political and military alliances, so often including specific arms bases.

KENNEDY POLICY

Mindful of these "hurricane winds of change," the Kennedy administration considered it to be both wise and expedient to pursue multiple strategy objectives on a kind of *ad hoc* basis. This approach was much in contrast with former dependence on fixed alliances backed by the prospect of massive retaliation—a security formula outmoded by the course of events. The new posture presumably would be more adaptable to changing circumstances, although any sudden crisis might require a hasty reappraisal of many factors and the fashioning of policy only roughly tailored to fit a new situation. Except in theory, this procedure was not very new, for previously conceived outlines of policy had never been found to be well adapted to actual situations.

The formula enunciated by President Kennedy, accepted without apparent change by the Johnson administration, while obviously opportunistic in some degree, may be more susceptible to temporizing and consequently may be the better suited for maneuver

or for some manner of negotiation and discussion.

There are still basic premises that give character and consistency to foreign policy. Among these is the belief that the United States should align itself with the forces of revolutionary progress whenever these can be identified. It was here that emphasis seemed to fall during President Kennedy's brief period of administration. In his first message to Congress, President Kennedy defined what he termed a new concept—development assistance—as a feature of foreign aid. He maintained that economic growth and political democracy develop hand in hand. During the months that followed, he and his aides attempted to implement this policy. The results, it must be recognized, have been disappointing, at least in the short run. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan, targets for this program, have veered away from the Western orbit. Iran, a principal recipient of United States interest and aid, has utilized all available funds, but has made little progress thus far. The United States thus has not succeeded in making secure this important segment of the CENTO alliance.

OTHER INFLUENCES

If the United States has fared rather better in the recent past in pursuance of foreign policy objectives in other parts of the Middle East—a debatable matter—probably it is less because of dynamism or objectivity in United States policy than because of the working of other influences. It may be suggested tentatively that the increased willingness of the United States to accept the "positive neutrality" of various countries of the area at face value has tended to improve the image of this country.

It is very likely that the Soviet pro-Arab policy has been diluted by the discovery by the oil-producing-and-transporting states of the Middle East that the Soviet oil offensive in Western Europe cuts into their own principal market area.

Any gains in United States favor attributable to such circumstances assuredly have been offset by others. United States willing-

ness to help support the population of Egypt with badly-needed shipments of grain elicited from Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser an invitation to "go jump in the lake" when Egyptian aid to Congo rebels was brought into question. Failure of the United States officially to inveigh against Israel's pumping of Jordan River water out of the Jordan Valley for the irrigation of Negev lands amplified doubts throughout the Arab world as to the objectivity of United States policy. Even the Turkish Republic—outside of the Middle East oil zone, but long a staunch Western ally—feels that the United States has failed to show a proper appreciation of the plight of the Turkish minority living on the island of Cyprus.

U.S. RESPONSIBILITY

Indeed, it is doubtful that any genuinely friendly regard for the United States can be expected from the Arab countries as long as no formula has been found for a fundamental improvement in Arab-Israeli relations. The Kennedy-Johnson administrations have made no more progress towards a solution of this problem than did their predecessors. In the Arab view, the United States bears the principal responsibility for the existence of the problem. Under such circumstances, the United States cannot deal without apparent prejudice either with the Arab states or with Israel. Thus United States sponsorship of Israel—though not necessarily of every Israeli move, as was demonstrated at the time of the Suez crisis—can be maintained only at a price. It is impossible to measure this cost, but undoubtedly it enters into every phase of United States relations with the nations of the Arab Middle East.

In retrospect, since the United States found it necessary, not long after the close of World War II, to assume the principal Western responsibility for the maintenance of a tolerably secure situation in the Middle East, its policy has evolved through successive stages. In this "vital" area, it seemed necessary to try to set limits to Soviet-Communist expansionism. Policy by containment gave way to policy by deterrence. As the limitations of

these policy concepts were learned through hard experience, assurance that in an all-out test of strength with totalitarian forces the United States would have greater survival ability introduced into American policy a large measure of *laissez-faire*. Thereafter, in the partial vacuum formed by the withdrawal of great-power control, the states of the area have had much more freedom to shape their own external relationships. Being realistic, however, it is not unreasonable to expect them to develop attitudes largely in accordance with the postures of the great powers in world affairs.

SOLUTION BY EVOLUTION

Given the world as it is, with unprecedented and immeasurable demographic and ideological forces partially unleashed, solutions of some of the more basic problems arising in the Middle East may be possible only in the evolutionary sense that time solves all problems. In practical terms, however, problems in international relations must be faced as they arise. With present reference to the Middle East, the task confronting American policy-makers is that of selecting elements of policy in accordance with visible interests of the United States and in keeping with the ideals embodied, for ready reference, in the charter of the United Nations. Presumably such an approach will be the most intelligent guide to lines of action in keeping with those great tides in human affairs that are beyond the immediate ken and control of the nations of the world.

Halford L. Hoskins founded the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1933 and served as its dean for 11 years before establishing the School of Advanced International Studies and the Middle East Institute in Washington, D. C. He has also served as Senior Specialist in International Relations for the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress and initiated the *Middle East Journal*. Among his many written works is *The Middle East: Problem Area in World Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1954).

Writing of Israel, this observer notes that "the old idealism which sustained the Israelis through war, austerity and the social dislocations caused by mass immigration, has been sharply dissipated."

Israel: The State of Siege

By DWIGHT J. SIMPSON
Professor of Economics, Istanbul University

A MILESTONE of Israeli politics was passed late in 1964 when, somewhat to the surprise of all concerned, it was demonstrated that the enormous prestige and power of former Prime Minister David Ben Gurion had been substantially diminished. Long the most powerful figure in Israeli public life, old patriarch Ben Gurion, whose career resembles an imaginary composite of George Washington, Charles de Gaulle and an American big city machine "boss," had finally retired in 1963. But he acted only after it was clear that his personal choice, Levi Eshkol, would succeed him as prime minister.

While in retirement, however, Ben Gurion remained obsessed by the so-called Lavon Affair, the outcome of which reflected considerable discredit on Ben Gurion personally and on much of his political career. Unfortunately—and unwisely, one might add—the Israeli government has never seen fit to allow publication of all the relevant documents surrounding this bitterly disputed matter. Consequently the public record of the incident is incomplete or only partially true or, even worse, apparently deliberately distorted. Until government censorship is withdrawn, judgments about the matter must necessarily remain tentative. Unfortunately for the stability of Israeli political life, the imposed secrecy continues to cause serious political injury.

Insofar as the story can be known, the

sordid Lavon Affair began in 1954 in Cairo, when Egyptian counterintelligence uncovered a large Israeli spy and sabotage organization operating in the Egyptian capital. According to evidence adduced at the public trial of the Israeli agents, it seemed that much of the purpose of the Israeli spy organization was to create incidents intended to embarrass or injure Egypt's relations with the West, particularly with the United States. Tentative plans seemed to have included the blowing up of United States embassy buildings and possibly the assassination of the United States ambassador himself. Following the imprisonment or execution of several of the Israeli agents who had been caught and tried, an Egyptian censorship was also imposed on the subject. From then on, observers on all sides began to speculate; consequently, the Lavon Affair has become enshrouded in myth and fancy, no small amount of which has been officially inspired at the highest levels within the Israeli government.

One line of speculation, clearly supportable by both evidence and logic, is that the Lavon Affair caused President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt to reason that Israeli's intentions were wholly aggressive and that, in the light of Israeli ambitions, Egypt's military defenses were drastically unprepared. Consequently, so it is argued, the Lavon Affair in effect stamped the then inexperienced Nasser to seek both diplomatic protection and important quantities of armaments from the Soviet

bloc, steps which were actually taken by Nasser by means of an agreement signed with the Soviet Union a few months later. Within the framework of this analysis, it is clear that from the Israeli perspective the Lavon Affair was a catastrophic blunder which gravely endangered Israel's foreign relations, touched off a frantic Middle Eastern arms race, and precluded any hope of an early Israeli-Arab *detente*. What remained was to fix responsibility and blame.

Pinhas Lavon had been minister of defense in Prime Minister Ben Gurion's cabinet in 1954 and it was known that the original orders instigating what came to be known as the Lavon Affair had originated in the defense ministry. Lavon, whose political enmity for Ben Gurion long antedated this incident, stubbornly insisted that the entire operation had been organized and put into effect without his knowledge. The implication was that a defense ministry cabal, loyal to Ben Gurion, was responsible. An inquiry commission's report, which effectively exonerated Lavon, was adopted by the Eshkol cabinet, in spite of an open warning by Ben Gurion that the report was intolerable.

Undaunted, Ben Gurion then demonstrated his still great political power by maneuvering within the Mapai party, Prime Minister Eshkol's main basis of parliamentary support, to bring the Eshkol government down. But what Ben Gurion had not calculated was the great public weariness of his embittered Lavon Affair crusade. An obvious majority in Israel appeared to agree with the Tel Aviv newspaper *Haaretz* that Israel had many more pressing problems and that Ben Gurion's private war against Lavon was "a useless exercise in self-flagellation."

To the anguish of a host of Israelis who regard him as a national savior, Ben Gurion unwisely staked his historic image on his unrelenting campaign against Pinhas Lavon. What may prove to have been a mortal blow to Ben Gurion's political strength was delivered in February, 1965. At the tenth annual Mapai party conference, by a vote of 1226 to 848, the party delegates rejected Ben Gurion's demand for a fresh judicial inquiry

into the Lavon Affair. Meanwhile the Eshkol government had been returned to power and the badly harassed prime minister was momentarily able to confront the nation's other pressing problems.

WATER SUPPLY

One of Israel's greatest problems, an adequate water supply, recently approached a temporary solution but, like many of the country's troubled affairs, this triumph possibly carried the seeds of a new disaster. In 1964, the great and costly water diversion system, which Israel has been constructing for the past decade, was finally opened. This scheme takes water from the Sea of Galilee in the north and, by means of pumps and natural gravity flow, transports it past the major city of Tel Aviv and on to the Negev desert region at a point between Beersheba, the "Gateway to the Negev," and the Gaza Strip. The first water flowed through the pipeline in May and the volume of flow was gradually increased so that by the end of 1964 the system was operating near capacity.


The economic impact on Israel of a new water supply—which will be increased again when Israel's other water diversion scheme for the Jordan River becomes operative—ought to be great. Both agricultural and industrial production are expected to show sharp gains within the next few years, since Israeli government planners have long complained that the lack of water in the area from Tel Aviv to Beersheba was the main factor stifling economic growth. Moreover, the population of the country, which is growing at a rate of approximately 90,000 persons annually, must have more water. The "In-gathering of the Exiles," the Israeli term for Jewish immigration to Israel, was in danger of drastic cutbacks unless adequate water supplies were found. Although Israel is working jointly with the United States to build atomic powered plants to convert sea water to fresh water, the full force of this costly project—even if it matures in the manner hoped—is many years in the future. Consequently, Israel's immediate needs will be met by the Galilee diversion scheme.

However, the international political impact of the opening of the new water system has been extremely grave. The Arab governments, especially those of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, whose own agricultural lands are heavily dependent upon water supplies from the Bika-Galilee-Jordan complex, have long warned that an Israeli diversion of water from Lake Galilee would be a *casus belli*. The so-called Arab summit meeting in Cairo in the summer of 1964 dealt almost entirely with this question. But at the meeting's end it was far from clear which Arab country planned to do what in response to the bold Israeli move. Consequently, while the Arab states persisted in their search for means and tactics with which to confront the Israelis on this question, the water continued to flow and Israel's economy to benefit.

ARMS RACE PARITY

If past history is a reliable guide, however, the verbally protesting Arab governments—once again outmaneuvered and outgunned by Israel—will eventually find it necessary to adjust to the newly created *status quo*. This outcome is clearly predictable unless the Arab governments, and here is meant primarily the United Arab Republic government led by President Gamal Abdul Nasser, are able seriously to alter the terms of the raging Middle Eastern arms race. Should President Nasser succeed in this aim, then Israel's vital water supply and her entire security would be mortally imperilled.

By means of an extremely clever maneuver completed early in 1965, it looked as if President Nasser were attempting to alter the arms balance. Nasser had extended an official invitation to the East German head of state, Walter Ulbricht, to make an official visit. Since this would be tantamount to U.A.R. diplomatic recognition of East Germany, an eventuality which the West German *Bundesrepublik* was most anxious to prevent, President Nasser had skillfully created a strong force of leverage to use on Bonn. In order to get Nasser's promise that no Egyptian diplomatic recognition of East Germany would result from Ulbricht's visit, Chancellor



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ISRAEL

Ludwig Erhard of the West German government agreed to suspend indefinitely some important shipments of German arms to Israel, including a quantity of American-made M-48 medium tanks. This was a great Nasser breakthrough.

Consequently, by mid-1965, it seemed clear that unless Israel could quickly obtain a new supplier of arms so that an Arab-Israeli arms race parity was maintained, President Nasser might have created the opening for which his

diplomacy had long been searching. Israel's traditional arms suppliers, including the United States and France, have recently demonstrated an increasing reluctance to continue their shipments. Unless one of the Great Powers can be prevailed upon to change its policy, and soon, the immediate future for Israel looks dangerous.

Moreover, Israel's defense policy had long rested on two principal bases. The first was the maintenance of a reasonable quantitative parity of arms with the U.A.R. The other was the proven battlefield superiority of an Israeli army consisting of a predominantly European soldiery. Now, however, the U.A.R. is on the verge of permanently altering the quantitative balance of the Arab-Israeli arms race, and the previous Israeli qualitative superiority of manpower is in danger of being swept away also. This latter result stems from the changed nature of the conscripted Israeli armed force. Reflecting Israel's changed population makeup, the Israeli army for the first time has an "Oriental" numerical majority in its ranks. These "Orientals" are Jewish immigrants from African or Asian countries who, for a variety of cultural and psychological reasons, are less readily adaptable for the tasks of soldiering than their "European" Jewish compatriots. In the long run, this manpower quality difference can doubtless be made up. But over the short run of the next few years the danger to Israel is potentially very great.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Developments in the economic sector are relatively encouraging even though Israel has fallen far short of eliminating the dangerous gap in its international balance of payments position. A very significant development occurred in April, 1964, when a formal agreement was finally signed in Brussels by Israeli representatives and those of the European Economic Community (Common Market). This was the climax of a prolonged and sometimes disappointing period of negotiations which had begun in November, 1962.

Under the terms of the Brussels agreement, which will last until 1967 with a provision for

subsequent extension, Israel will receive immediate substantial tariff cuts on 25 of its export products to the six-nation Common Market. The agreement also provides for the establishment of a joint Israeli-Common Market committee which will meet periodically to supervise the treaty's implementation and to deal with the expected range of problems that will arise. This, incidentally, was the first concession of sovereignty on the part of Israel since the state was founded 17 years ago. Although the Common Market agreement does not cover major Israeli export products such as oranges, tires, eggs and plywood—and does not meet her request for associate membership in the E.E.C.—a status that had been granted earlier to Greece and Turkey—it was widely hailed as the best that could be achieved at this stage. In the words of Israel's Foreign Minister, Golda Meir, the agreement "serves as a first step, offering a hope of future association, while providing for stable economic relations with the prospering Common Market."

Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir characterized 1964 as one of "advancement down the road to economic independence," and certain statistics released from his office at year's end were indeed impressive. Israel's population increased to 2,500,000, the total representing a 3.6 per cent increase (approximately 90,000) over last year. Of these, fewer than 4,200 were listed as unemployed in 1964, indicating a very tight labor market as well as a rapid absorption of newcomers into the economy. Approximately 235,000 tourists came to Israel during 1964, leaving behind them nearly \$60 million in foreign exchange. Moreover, prospects for a greatly expanded tourist industry are excellent; hotel construction and a general enlargement of tourist facilities are being vigorously undertaken. For the first time, the cultivated land passed the one-million-acre level and Israel reached self-sufficiency in a wide variety of agricultural products while continuing to increase exports of others. The total value of agricultural production in 1964 was approximately \$410 million, which represented a 7 per cent increase in real terms over the preceding year.

Citrus products in particular showed a handsome gain in export earnings.

By far the most striking economic advance reported by Finance Minister Sapir was that achieved in the Israeli diamond industry. Although a comparative newcomer to the trade, Israel by the end of 1964 was the world's second largest producer of polished diamonds after Belgium. Output has soared since 1948 when the industry employed 800 workers and Israeli exports of gems amounted to less than \$1 million. By 1964, the number of workers had risen to 8,500 and exports topped \$110 million. Indeed, this startling success of the diamond industry in the export field amounted to nearly one-third of the total value of all Israeli exports.

There were other signs from Israel's crucially important economic front that were far less encouraging, however. Her balance of payments for 1963 was the best for several years; her balance for 1964 was one of the worst. The spectacular rise of imports to meet rapidly increasing local consumer demand assumed proportions that might endanger the success of the 1962 economic reforms, which had included a currency devaluation. During the past year, imports rose from \$610 to \$655 million; imports from Great Britain alone, whose products are the highest priced of all the major producing countries of Europe, increased from \$99 million to \$127 million.

Meanwhile, Israeli exports, although they reached a new high of \$336 million and were expanding at one of the fastest rates in the world, fell further behind in the struggle to balance with imports. Consequently, Israel's deficit for 1964 reached the record height of \$329 million. To some extent this deficit was made up by other means, such as donations from abroad, chiefly from the United Jewish Appeal in the United States (\$70 million), the remainder of West German reparations (\$28 million), and long-term government loans. But in the main, the great Achilles heel of the Israeli economy in 1964 was the continued inability or unwillingness to contain the rise in living standards within manageable bounds.

Throughout the recent past, Israelis have wrestled with the increasingly intractable problem of wages and salaries paid to unionized labor and to government employees. Pressures in this sector have reached such intensity that Finance Minister Sapir has become badly isolated in his struggle to hold firm to a 1963 government wage and salary "line." The 1963 bargain comprised, in general terms, an agreement to seek no new taxes, wage rises or cost-of-living changes due to price increases. Even within his own Mapai party, Sapir found small effective support for his thoroughly sensible, albeit politically unpopular, anti-inflationary policy. Sapir's principal objective was to extend the 1963 package deal which included concessions from all interested parties: government, business and labor. But at the end of 1963, 45,000 teachers and school administrators went on strike, followed by a token one-day "warning" strike by 20,000 civil servants. And by mid-1964 it was plain that the trade unions were insisting on substantial wage increases, their demands underscored by a wave of strikes in various sectors of the economy.

In the face of such massive pressure, it is understandable that the Government found it necessary to retreat from its former position. Consequently, 1964 was marked both by strikes (many of them unauthorized by union leaders) and by a steep upward wage drift. This had undesirable effects throughout the economy. With more money available through wage increases, domestic consumer buying has risen to record heights. This has meant that much Israeli industrial production has been diverted from the export trade to the local market, to the consequent detriment of the balance of payments position. Moreover, because of increased labor costs, Israeli exports have become higher priced and thus far less competitive in the hotly-contested European market. One official measure taken to ease the labor shortage and thus influence (if only indirectly) the wage-increase pressure was to shorten the length of military service required of conscripts. The service period for men was reduced from 30 to 26 months and, for women, from 24 to

20 months. This same measure had been recently adopted in Holland to meet a similar labor problem, and had produced beneficial results. Israel's officials were cautiously hopeful of paralleling the Dutch experience.

A perceptive observer of the Israeli scene cannot fail to notice, however, that there is something far more seriously wrong with the country than divisive political quarrels and rampant undiscipline on the economic front. Indeed, serious though these problems may be, it often seems that they are only the warning signals of a far more profound ailment. Admittedly, such an analysis rests on insight and intuition.

Still, it is no great problem to document some of its outstanding features. These include the attitude of the older generation, Israeli men and women who are past 40 and whose lives have been uniformly marked by struggle, sacrifice and hardship. It is they who vividly remember the long, bitter military and political battle that led to statehood in 1948 and it is they who are weary to the point of exhaustion from the sacrifices they made. Mainly, they are desperately tired of waiting for the peace with the Arabs which once they thought was imminent. Indeed, all that seems imminent now is war, and if not war, then an indefinite continuation of political blockade, border "incidents," and a series of military budgets which consume 50 per cent of annual government costs.

The old idealism, which sustained the Israelis through war, austerity and the social dislocations caused by mass immigration, has been sharply dissipated. This is perfectly understandable and, indeed, one can sympathize with the disappointment of the Israeli pioneers whose enormous personal sacrifices resulted not in the new Zion but in something that more and more resembles a Levantine garrison state under permanent seige.

Then there is the problem of the Israeli youth. Although the younger generations of all countries seem to disappoint their elders, the Israeli youth's disaffection is especially noticeable. The young Israelis seem to have little or no interest in *chalutzut*—a willingness to pioneer blended with selfless devotion

to an ideal—nor do they appear to have any special reverence for anything that is not closely related to their own personal well-being. Indeed, the youth, together with the newcomers—"Oriental" Jews from Africa and Asia who now comprise a majority of the population—seem badly alienated, almost bewildered by a society which pays official lip service to idealism and sacrifice but whose members seem intent mainly on self-enrichment.

The siege mentality, induced by 17 years of isolated existence in a hostile Arab world, has developed to such a point that all Israelis seem increasingly present-minded, with little or no thought of the future. Consequently, early in 1965, Israeli public opinion was able to accept with great indifference the appalling economic news that the 1964 trade deficit had reached \$500 million, an increase of \$184 million over the preceding year. Moreover, the widely-prescribed remedy, "eat, drink and be merry" is, under existing Israeli conditions, a formula for the disaster against which the older generation fought for so long but which may yet overtake the badly-winded Israeli nation.

Indeed, at its most pessimistic, this line of analysis concludes that if such a result is to be averted, Israel needs a rebirth of the spirit on which the country was originally founded. More optimistically, one might assert that Israel is suffering only normal growing pains as the young state passes from adolescence to adulthood. It is arguable that, after a transition period, the way will be cleared for further growth and achievement. For the present, one can only suspend judgment and join with interested observers of the Israeli scene who will be watching closely to see in which direction the country eventually moves.

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Pointing out that "At no time during the first three years of the Republic's existence did the protecting powers offer constructive suggestions for the amelioration of Cyprus' constitutional controversy," this author maintains that "... the onus of responsibility for the breakdown of the governmental machinery of Cyprus cannot be attributed primarily to the Greek Cypriots nor to the Turkish Cypriots. It must be borne by the three protecting powers—Great Britain, Greece and Turkey—who presented Cyprus with the most bizarre and complicated of constitutions."

The Cyprus Dispute

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THE POTENTIALLY PERNICIOUS character of the Cyprus dispute raises for the United States a dilemma of major proportions. If we side with the Greek Cypriots in their struggle for majority rule on Cyprus, we weaken our alliance with Turkey; if we oppose the Greek Cypriot majority, we impair our ties with Greece and run the risk of turning Cyprus into a Mediterranean Cuba. If we straddle the fence on the Cyprus issue, we incur the enmity of both Greece and Turkey, and open new opportunities for Russian diplomacy in its historical quest for power and influence in the Mediterranean world and beyond.

From the days of the Truman Doctrine, it was clearly understood that Greece and Turkey should be bound together in the same defense establishment, essentially within the larger context of the Atlantic Community,

and that they should not allow their differences to obscure the larger issue of Western unity and security. But it is precisely because the mutual interests which bind Greece and Turkey are presently limited to a commitment to common action in the very unlikely event of Soviet aggression that the maintenance of Greek-Turkish solidarity has become increasingly difficult. Another element which critically complicates our security arrangements in the eastern Mediterranean arises from the fact that whereas prior to 1959 there were only three parties to the Cyprus dispute—Britain, Greece, and Turkey—all members of the NATO alliance, after 1959 there have been four parties to the dispute—Britain, Greece, and Turkey, and a non-NATO member, the sovereign Republic of Cyprus.

The struggle of the distinctly Hellenic island of Cyprus¹ for *Enosis* or union with Greece has had a long and frustrating history. In March, 1821, when the modern Greek state was born, the first Greek flag of rebellion was raised against the Ottoman Turks. In July of that year the Turks imprisoned hundreds of Greek Cypriots for conspiring to assist the insurgents on the Greek mainland. Because the vast majority of the Greeks were left outside the boundaries of the truncated Greek state, carved out of the Ottoman Em-

¹ For over 2,000 years the Greek Cypriots formed the vast majority of the island's population. When the Turks conquered the island in 1571 it had a population of 160,000 Greeks. After the conquest about 30,000 Turkish settlers were given land on the island. From time to time their number increased by Turkish immigration from Asia Minor. For a brief period in the eighteenth century the Turkish population on the island became a majority. By 1777, there were 47,000 Turks on the island compared to 37,000 Greeks, but by the time of the Greek War for Independence in 1821, the Greek population again became the majority.

pire in 1830, the desire to expand, to liberate more and more Greeks from Turkish rule, became the motivating force of Greek foreign policy. Indeed, for almost 100 years, the Greek people were passionately attached to a foreign policy inspired by the *Megali Idea* or Great Idea—the independence and unification of all the Greeks.

Greece obtained the Ionian Islands in 1864; Thessaly and one district of Epirus in 1881. Crete, Southern Epirus, a large portion of Macedonia, and most of the Aegean islands came to her as a result of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913. By the end of these wars the majority of the Greeks were finally united under the Greek flag. About 2.5 million "unredeemed" Greeks were left scattered in Bulgaria, Turkey, the Dodecanese Islands, and Cyprus, but only in the last two territories did they constitute majorities. In the decade which followed the Balkan Wars, Greece obtained Western Thrace and an exchange of population agreement with Bulgaria. But her renewed struggle with Turkey ended in total defeat. During the Greek-Turkish war of 1919–1922, the legitimate desire to protect the national interest and the romantic dream of an imperial Greece with its capital at Constantinople (Istanbul) became fatally fused in the Greek mind. The price Greece paid for its Anatolian venture was the mass expulsion of 1.25 million Greeks from their ancestral homes in Eastern Thrace and Anatolia. Thus, the only major areas of the Greek world left outside of Greece after the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne were the Dodecanese Islands and Cyprus.

Italy had occupied the Dodecanese in her 1911–1912 war with Turkey and had thereby prevented Greece from occupying them during the Balkan Wars. She held onto them,

² It was the threat to the Suez Canal from Russian penetration into Armenia which led the British to acquire Cyprus in 1878 as a base from which to assist Turkey in the defense of Asia Minor. The island was to be occupied and administered by Britain until such time as Russia restored Kars and the other conquests made by her in Armenia during the war of 1877–1878. The island was annexed by Britain in November, 1914, and in 1925 was organized as a Crown Colony. Turkey had relinquished all claims to it by the Treaty of Lausanne, July, 1923.

in spite of the pleas of the Dodecanesians for *Enosis* or union with Greece, until her defeat in World War II. At the 1946 Paris Peace Conference, the islands were awarded to Greece in recognition of her heroic struggle against Mussolini and Hitler. Turkey did not contest the award because she had remained neutral during most of the war.

The British occupation of Cyprus in 1878² prevented a Greek-Turkish contest over the island during the Balkan Wars and World War I. During the period of British rule, the Greek Cypriots frequently argued, pleaded, petitioned and demonstrated for their independence and for *Enosis*, but without results. Limited independence finally came in 1959, forced by four years of violence on the island and by the imminent threat of war between Greece and Turkey.

THE UNWANTED REPUBLIC

By the end of 1958, the Greek government of Constantine Karamanlis came to realize that the Cyprus controversy had reached a complete deadlock and that further attempts to bring about the union of the troubled island with Greece would have disastrous consequences. It decided that the threat of war by Turkey, and the danger of estrangement from Britain and the United States, could best be met by strategic retreat.

The refusal of the United States to implement the high principle of self-determination at the expense of British and Turkish goodwill and the inability of Greece to muster adequate support at the United Nations in December, 1959, occasioned the first positive diplomatic contacts. In New York on December 5, Turkish Foreign Minister Fatim Rüştü Zorlu and Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff exchanged views on a compromise settlement for Cyprus which would exclude the union of the island with Greece or the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey. Within three months, there was a settlement of the Cyprus issue.

The Turks were willing to drop partition but insisted on the maximum separation of communal affairs and a guarantee of Turkish Cypriot participation in the administration of

the island on the basis of equality rather than on the basis of proportional representation. They also insisted that the security of the Turkish mainland vis-à-vis Cyprus could only be achieved by stationing Turkish troops on the island. Turkey's minimum demands were for an independent and jointly-administered Republic, in which Turkish and Greek Cypriots were to share power equally, and for a Turkish military presence on the island to guarantee the security of her southern borders.

The acceptance by Greece of Turkey's minimum demands paved the way for a meeting in Zurich, February 5–11, of the prime ministers of the two countries. And on February 11, they initialled a declaration stating that Cyprus would become an independent state with a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president, and detailing the "Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus." This was immediately followed by a conference in London attended by the prime ministers and foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey, as well as by a Greek Cypriot delegation headed by Archbishop Makarios, and a Turkish Cypriot delegation headed by Dr. Fazil Küçük.

The main impediment to the final independence of Cyprus was disagreement on the size of the two areas to remain under British sovereignty, at Dhekelia and Akrotiri. The minimum demand of the British was 120 square miles; but Archbishop Makarios would not agree to more than 36 square miles. Finally, on July 6, 1960, an agreement was reached limiting the British base areas on the island to 99 square miles. A few weeks earlier, Britain also agreed, at Makarios' insistence, that if and when she decided to relinquish her sovereignty over the bases they would revert to the Republic of Cyprus, and that in any case the base areas would be under Cypriot civil administration. On July 29, without opposition, the British parliament passed the bill establishing the sovereign inde-



CYPRUS

pendent Republic of Cyprus, and on August 16, 1960, Cyprus became independent.³

The Cyprus settlement keenly disappointed the Greek Cypriots. Their aspirations for *Enosis* had not been realized and their struggle and sacrifices for majority rule had gone unrewarded. Anticipating the bitter reaction of the Cypriots to the final settlement, the Zurich agreements were worked up in secrecy. It was agreed that the proposed constitution would not be subject to a plebiscite, and that the Cypriots would not be permitted to bargain for changes in the constitution that would in any way alter the political rights granted to the Turkish minority.

At the conference table at Lancaster House, Archbishop Makarios was faced with the difficult decision of accepting the Zurich and London agreements *in toto* and restoring peace to the island, or of rejecting them completely and subjecting his people to more war and more suffering. All the interested powers implored him to sign the agreements and avoid further bloodshed. Britain threatened him with the partition of Cyprus, and Turkey warned that she would walk out of the conference if Makarios tried to tamper with the

³ For the text of documents mentioned above see Parliamentary Papers, Command Paper (Cmd) 697, *Cyprus*. London, 1959. For the final agreements see Parliamentary Papers, Cmd 1093, *Cyprus*. London, 1960.

Zurich constitution. Appeals were made to him from Athens and the Greek royal family to sign. The Greek prime minister shouted at him impatiently, "I give you Cyprus on a plate, and you refuse to take it. It's monstrous,"⁴ and threatened Makarios with the withdrawal of all support if he rejected the Zurich terms. Only the Cypriots warned him that to accept them would be a betrayal of everything that he himself and the Cypriots had fought to achieve. Under pressure from all sides, Makarios capitulated and the Greek Cypriot delegation voted 27 to 8 in favor.

The main objection of the Greek Cypriots to the "Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus" consisted of a number of provisions which were to become entrenched in the Constitution of Cyprus and which, in their opinion, gave excessive constitutional rights to the Turkish minority.

This document offered a unique form of presidential constitution, in which a Turkish vice-president representing 18 per cent of the population and elected solely by that population, held veto powers on foreign affairs, defense, security, and on some financial questions. The two executives were empowered to appoint their own ministers; seven Greeks and three Turkish. The ratio of seven to three was to be applied to positions in the public service, the police and gendarmerie, and in the house of representatives (35 Greeks and 15 Turkish members). The ratio was fixed independently of statistical data. The proportion in the Cyprus army was to be 60 per cent Greek and 40 per cent Turkish. Any modification of the electoral law and the adoption of any law relating to the municipalities and of any law imposing duties and taxes required a separate simple majority of the representatives elected by the Greek and Turkish community respectively taking part in the vote.

The vice-president of the house was to be a Turk, and all the Turkish representatives were to be elected solely by the Turkish community. Each community was to have its communal chamber with the right to impose

taxes and levies on members of its community and to exercise authority on religious, charitable, and educational questions, and on questions of personal status. In the event of a conflict of authority between the house of representatives and the communal chambers, such conflict was to be decided by the supreme constitutional court composed of one Greek, one Turk, and a neutral judge appointed jointly by the president and the vice-president of the republic. The neutral judge, always a national of a foreign country, was to be president of the court. Separate municipalities were to be created in the five largest towns of Cyprus by the Turkish inhabitants of these towns. A high court of justice was also to be established consisting of two Greeks, one Turk, and one neutral who would be the president of the court and have two votes. In civil and criminal cases the tribunal would consist of judges belonging to the same community. If the injured party belonged to another community, the composition of the tribunal would be mixed and would be determined by the high court of justice.

The Greek Cypriots also protested the Treaty of Guarantee which gave Britain, Greece and Turkey—the three protecting powers—the right to take joint or individual action in Cyprus with the sole aim of re-establishing its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its constitution. Criticism was also directed at the Treaty of Alliance which would establish a Tripartite Headquarters (Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish) on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish contingents on Cyprus were to consist of 950 Greek soldiers and 650 Turkish soldiers respectively. But the president and the vice-president of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in agreement, could request the Greek and Turkish governments to increase or reduce their contingents on the island. The above treaties were to be an integral part of the Cyprus constitution.

The basic articles of the constitution, especially those relating to the percentages and to the separate and universal suffrage, could

⁴ Doros Alastos, *Cyprus Guerrilla: Grivas, Makarios and the British* (London, 1960), p. 3.

not be amended in any way. Other provisions of the constitution could be amended by a law passed by a majority vote comprising at least two-thirds of the total number of the representatives belonging to the Greek community and at least two-thirds of the total number of representatives belonging to the Turkish community.

Perhaps the greatest objections voiced by Makarios and the opposition in Greece were that the new accords gave Turkey legal rights on Cyprus which she had surrendered in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and that the Greek Cypriots were being sacrificed for the more general interests of Western security, i.e., Anglo-Turkish support in NATO and CENTO.

The Zurich and London agreements can be criticized for severely limiting Cyprus' internal sovereignty by prescribing her form of government and by dictating to her on fundamental aspects of her public law. Criticism can also be leveled at the three protecting powers for devising a rigid and complicated system of checks and balances that would prevent majority rule and segregate the Greek and Turkish communities still further. One can also complain that the agreements would arrest in its infancy the political and constitutional growth of the island republic. But Cyprus was given its independence with these impediments because there was no other solution acceptable to all the parties and because the sole alternative seemed to be further bloodshed and the dismemberment of the NATO arrangements in the eastern Mediterranean.

COLLAPSE OF THE AGREEMENTS

In March, 1959, when Makarios returned to Cyprus after three years of exile, he found the Greek Cypriots full of resentment toward the Zurich and London agreements and the Turkish Cypriots deeply suspicious of his willingness and competence to enforce all provisions of the proposed constitution. His was the almost impossible task of persuading the diverse segments of the Greek community to accept the spirit of the agreements and of convincing the Turkish community that its

future on the island could best be served by emphasizing the unifying rather than the divisive elements of the compromise settlement.

In the 18 months prior to August 16, 1960, when Cyprus became independent, Makarios succeeded in holding together the Greek Cypriots and persuaded them to accept the complicated constitution of the Republic. The small but well-organized Communist organization of the island—the Communist Reform party of the working people, AKEL—made little headway against Makarios' leadership and could not capture more than 25 per cent of Greek Cypriot support. Although AKEL continued to criticize the presence of the British bases on the island and the excessive rights of the Turkish minority, it publicly acknowledged the archbishop as the leader of all the Greek Cypriots. The price Makarios paid for this support was five of the thirty-five seats in the House of Representatives, which were allotted to AKEL.

The most serious threat to Makarios' leadership came from another quarter. In the summer of 1959, General George Grivas, the former guerrilla chief who led the military struggle against the British on Cyprus, issued a statement from Athens denouncing the archbishop for signing the Zurich and London agreements. The reversal of the general's position caught the archbishop by surprise, and after days of uneasy silence, he finally lashed out at Grivas and his supporters. On July 26, from the pulpit of the church of Agios Nicolaos, Makarios urged the people of Cyprus to turn their faces with contempt from the whispers and the shouts of demagogues who would exploit their struggle. In no uncertain terms he condemned the revival of the campaign for political union with Greece as sheer adventurism.

For almost three months, Cyprus seemed headed for a civil war, and the work of the constitutional commission in Nicosia was practically brought to a standstill. Finally, however, Makarios persuaded the general that only the Communists and the Turks would gain if their forces were divided and prevailed upon him to join in a unity pledge.

On the Turkish front, Makarios was less successful. Although for some time after the Zurich and London agreements, the archbishop and Dr. Küçük made numerous public appearances calling for the restoration of cordial relations between the two communities, there was an almost complete lack of faith and good will.

The Turkish Cypriots did not believe that the Greek Cypriots would permanently accept the Zurich and London agreements and implement their rights as outlined by the constitution. Additional insurance was needed for the future. In the spring of 1959 they initiated a campaign to sell their land in overwhelmingly Greek areas and to purchase land in Turkish areas. In the constitutional commission they were completely at odds with their Greek colleagues over the question of the rights of the Turkish vice-president. They visualized the vice-president as a co-president. The president would control the steering wheel but the vice-president would control the gears and the brakes. During this period, they also took clandestine military precautions to bolster their position.

The separate Turkish municipal councils which were set up during the last year (1958) of colonial rule were continued and strengthened. The power and authority of the Turkish communal chamber were extended beyond questions of religion, education and culture. It became a kind of Turkish parliament of Cyprus with jurisdiction in economic, financial and political affairs. After a few hundred recruits were taken in to form the cadre of a token Cyprus army of 2,000, of which 40 per cent were to be Turkish, Dr. Küçük notified Makarios that the Cyprus army should be divided into racial units. In October, 1961, he exercised his right of veto to prevent the enactment of the cabinet decision for integrated military units.

But the sorest point of friction between the two communities was the implementation of Article 173 of the constitution which provided that separate municipalities should be created in the five largest towns of the Republic—Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Paphos—by the Turkish inhabitants thereof.

The Cypriots failed to produce any agreed criteria for the division of the municipalities. The Turkish Cypriots answered the refusal of the Greek Cypriots to accept their recommendation for the geographical division of the municipalities by voting down the customs law (March, 1961) and the income tax law (December, 1961). On March 19, 1962, another bid to end the deadlock over the question of municipalities was made at a meeting between President Makarios and Vice-President Küçük. Makarios expressed the Greek view that geographic separation would jeopardize the interests of Greeks and Turks and suggested the maintenance of a unified municipal authority with representation of Greek and Turkish councillors based on the proportion of the population of the respective communities in each town. He then offered a three-point formula to safeguard the interests and rights of the Turkish residents under a unified municipal authority. On March 21, Dr. Küçük formally rejected Makarios' proposals and insisted that the geographic partition of the municipalities could be brought about. He also declared that the Turkish community had no trust in safeguards.

The last attempt to reach a mutually acceptable solution for the "battle of the five towns" was made in December, 1962. It ended in failure, and caused the Greek members of the house to defeat a Turkish bill providing for the extension of the existing municipal laws for the period of one year as from January 1, 1963. Makarios then proceeded to bring the town councils under the direct control of the central government; the Turks reacted by "legalizing" councils of their own. Appeals were made to the supreme constitutional court, whose neutral president, Dr. Ernst Forsthoff, ruled that both moves were invalid.

In 1963, Cyprus was without an income tax law, a customs law, or a municipalities law. Tempers and tension rose to new heights and the two communities seemed helplessly headed for a major confrontation. Convinced by now that the Turks would not consider any change in the constitution by agree-

ment and that their ultimate aim was to partition the island, the Greek Cypriots began to talk of removing the divisive and negative elements of the constitution unilaterally or by force if necessary. At the same time, moved by fear of being treated as a minority and believing that majority rule would eventually lead to *Enosis*, the Turkish Cypriots threatened that any Greek effort to amend the constitution without their approval would meet with Turkish might and would result in "partition or death."

Nonetheless, the onus of responsibility for the breakdown of the governmental machinery of Cyprus cannot be attributed primarily to the Greek Cypriots nor to the Turkish Cypriots. It must be borne by the three protecting powers—Great Britain, Greece and Turkey—who presented Cyprus with the most bizarre and complicated of constitutions. The will of four-fifths of the population was equated with the will of one-fifth; instead of majority rule and minority check, the Cypriots were given dualism in government; instead of cooperation and co-existence, the constitution encouraged resentment and separation.

At no time during the first three years of the republic's existence did the protecting powers offer constructive suggestions for the amelioration of Cyprus' constitutional controversy. Yet it was obvious to the sympathetic observer that the well-being, indeed, the future, of the Turkish community on Cyprus could be ensured only by cooperation between the two communities and that this cooperation was attainable only by the elimination of some of the divisive elements of the constitution and by the reaffirmation of the provisions of the constitution prohibiting either the union of the island with Greece or partition.

RENEWAL OF THE CONFLICT

The clashes that began on December 21, 1963, and culminated in full-scale civil strife, caught the leadership of the two communities completely unprepared. It was popular knowledge that both communities had built up supplies of arms and had planned for a show of force, but there was

no indication that the incidents which sparked the outbreak of violence had official sanction. Indeed, chaos and confusion reigned in Cyprus during the first week of the fighting and Makarios and Küçük tried to stop the clashes by issuing several common appeals for order and reason.

The deteriorating situation in Cyprus also caught the United States and the protecting powers completely unprepared. On December 23, in an effort to avert the impending explosion, the acting British high commissioner and the United States ambassador called on President Makarios and expressed the grave concern of their governments at the turn of events in Cyprus. They appealed for moderation from both communities. The Greek government also urged Makarios to use his influence to end the inter-communal bloodshed, and the Turkish government appealed to the Turkish Cypriots to assist responsible administrators with calm and dignity.

It was too late. Relations between the two communities had been allowed to decline to a point of no return. Makarios would not alter his intention to have the constitution amended and Küçük would not agree to a compromise formula. Moreover, the fighting had created further hatred and suspicion and revealed the clandestine military and political preparations of the two communities. Control over the impatient extremist elements and the irregular armed bands within the communities was also completely lacking.

The renewal of the Cyprus conflict brought Greece and Turkey once again to the brink of war. The joint plea for peace issued by the protecting powers on December 23 was followed the next day by rumors of a Turkish invasion. The Turkish army contingent on Cyprus had marched out of its appointed camp and had taken positions on the northern outskirts of Nicosia and along the Nicosia-Kyrenia road which leads to the northern coast of Cyprus. Turkish jets screamed low over the rooftops of Nicosia, and Turkish naval units were spotted maneuvering off the coast of the island. Following the Turk-

ish example, the Greek army contingent also left its barracks and took positions to counter a possible Turkish invasion.

War between the NATO partners was averted by the swift action of the British. On Christmas Day, Britain secured from Greece and Turkey an agreement to place the troops of the "protecting powers" in Cyprus under British command. Using the threat of a Turkish invasion, Britain also secured from Archbishop Makarios permission to assist the Cyprus government to ensure the maintenance of a cease-fire and the restoration of peace. At dawn on the following day, British troops began to move into position between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot forces, by agreement with their leaders, and on December 27, a formal cease-fire was agreed upon.

Meanwhile, President Cemal Gursal of Turkey had cabled a plea to various foreign capitals for action to "prevent further acts of genocide" on the island, and for a second time jet-fighters were sent to buzz Nicosia. Although the Cyprus government had withdrawn its earlier request for the intervention of the Security Council of the United Nations, the second threat of a Turkish invasion prompted Cyprus Foreign Minister Spyridon Kyprianou to telephone all foreign envoys in Nicosia apprising them of the situation. As a result, in the last days of December the Soviet Union denounced any attempt at foreign intervention in Cyprus and United States President Lyndon Johnson from his ranch in Texas sent cablegrams to Makarios and Küçük calling for a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

While the fighting between the two communities had declined considerably in early January, 1964, the threat of war between Greece and Turkey remained very much alive. For a third time, Turkish jets buzzed Nicosia and the Turkish navy seemed poised for an invasion. The Greek navy was also placed on the alert and the Greek government asked NATO to prevent unilateral action by Turkey in Cyprus. In New York,

⁵ For an account of the conference, see United Nations Doc. S/PV. 1095, 18 Feb, 1964, pp. 22-45.

the Ambassador of Cyprus to the United Nations, Zenon Rossides, had demanded an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

Because of the persuasiveness of Duncan Sandys, the British Commonwealth Relations Minister, all official parties to the Cyprus dispute agreed to attend a peace-making conference in London on January 15, 1964. However, the conference in London was a complete failure. The Greek Cypriots insisted that they had a right to amend their constitution to ensure majority rule and that the Treaty of Guarantee did not give Turkey the right of military intervention in Cyprus without the permission of the Cyprus government. The Turkish government insisted that it had the right to intervene militarily and that the constitution could not be amended without Turkish approval. It insisted that if the constitution did not work it was because it was never fully implemented and that barring the full implementation of the constitution the dispute could be ended only by partition or federation.⁵

The situation on Cyprus grew steadily worse. More troops were urgently needed to support the force of only 2,700 British soldiers that remained to keep the peace. The Turkish contingent refused to move back to its barracks and, although the Greek contingent willingly placed itself under British command, for obvious reasons it could not participate in the British peace-keeping efforts. At this point, the diplomatic initiative was taken by United States Under-Secretary of State George Ball, who in early

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"In most Asian countries," as this specialist points out, "too little reform, too late, has caused revolutions. But in Iran, it is too much reform, too soon, that causes unrest."

Dilemma in Iran

By MARWAN JABRI
Author of The Arab Lands of Western Asia

THE CRISIS which has engulfed Iran in recent years has often been described in terms of an economic conflict between a progressive, enlightened Shah and a backward, "unholy alliance" of clergymen, aristocrats and Communists. The antagonists have themselves been officially described in such terms as "black reactionaries," "corrupt bureaucrats," and "enemies of the people." Their motives have been related to greed and corruption, and their objectives have been ascribed to sinister designs, characterized by criminal methods and acts of violence, seeking to nullify the Shah's agrarian and fiscal measures and to deprive the people of their rightful gains.

Though generally accurate, such oversimplified descriptions of the situation in Iran are dangerously misleading. The crisis in that country cannot be viewed simply in terms of progress versus backwardness; nor can the opposition to the Shah be regarded merely as a bizarre coalition of crackpots and illiterate fanatics. Yet, on the other hand, it is equally erroneous to assume (as a result of our own inability to recognize the proper elements in the crisis) that the Shah's sincerity in instituting reforms is questionable, or that his efforts to eradicate social injustice are futile. On the contrary, his humane enlightenment is now more in evidence throughout Iran, and his "white revolution" is more vital to the political future of his country

than ever. Unfortunately, however, his formidable task of catching up with the present is constantly sabotaged by the lingering blunders of the past.

There is also another misconception about the crisis. Iran is most sensitive to the American diplomatic attitude; and since that attitude is traditionally determined, first and foremost, by the factor of communism, there has been a growing tendency to minimize the inherently internal character of the Iranian crisis by relating it to the cold war.

Such a relationship does not seem to exist. It is true, however, that both the United States and the Soviet Union have more or less vital interests in Iran. The United States is militarily committed to the defense of Iran, presumably against Soviet attack. The continuous flow of Iranian oil into the industries of Western Europe is another, indirect, American commitment. Finally, American deterring influence is as vital politically to the defense of Turkey and Pakistan as to that of Iran herself. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, nurtures centuries-old ambitions which have manifested themselves geographically, ethnically, and now, ideologically, in many segments of Iran's political life.

Such irreconcilable interests as those of the United States and the Soviet Union have, naturally, produced a disturbing impact upon Iran. Nevertheless, she has been more successful than most Middle Eastern countries

in remaining on the periphery of international tension. In fact, the Mossadegh episode¹ has been the full extent of Iran's involvement in the cold war, although many may consider Moscow's reaction in the 1950's to Iran's membership in the Baghdad Pact, now CENTO, another prominent chapter in Teheran's participation in the East-West war of nerves. Moreover, Irano-Soviet relations have steadily improved over the past few years. The Shah, while still firmly committed to Western military defenses, has masterfully lifted those relations from a stage of direct military occupation in the mid-1940's to one of diplomacy in the early 1960's, when he refused to allow United States nuclear missiles on Iranian soil.

These considerations will hold true only under present conditions. The Chinese have not yet been fully heard from in the Middle East. Moreover, a return of the cold war to southwestern Asia, or a sudden leftist upsurge in Turkey, for example, or in Pakistan, could upset Iran's international equilibrium. Then it would no longer be a question of possession or dispossession of wealth, but whether or not that ancient kingdom is to become, sooner or later, another Iraq, or even another Vietnam.

More accurately, the crisis in Iran is essentially a product of internal struggle for political supremacy among determined forces, some of which are foreign-oriented. In essence, it is a crisis of leadership in search of a nationalist base.

POLITICAL ALIGNMENT

The alignment of the political forces in Iran is very significant. First, there is the all-powerful Shah. He appoints and dismisses governments, formulates and enforces policies, hand-picks candidates for national elections, dissolves the legislative body at will, and frequently rules by decree. His authority is sustained by the secret police, the "élite," and, above all, the army, an oversized machinery of about one-fourth of a million men.

¹ For details of the regime of Mohammed Mossadegh, see George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956.)

Then there is the opposition to the Shah, a conglomeration of politically-minded groups which have in common fear, on the one hand, and ruthlessness, on the other. The opposition includes underground Communists, Islamists, Arabicists, ethnic minorities, traditionalists, businessmen, landowners, "intellectuals," professional politicians, and smaller, unidentifiable factions. Their collective powers, though negative and often impulsive, are tremendous. They thrive on turmoil and grow in the shadows. Though better known for extremism, fanaticism and violence, the opposition also includes many responsible leaders with sound objectives.

The immediate issues in the conflict derive largely from the Shah's "white revolution," based on a six-point program: 1) land redistribution, 2) profit-sharing for factory workers, 3) the nationalization of forestry, 4) a literacy corps, 5) the sale of state-owned factories to the public in order to finance the program and encourage industrialization, 6) electoral reforms, including female suffrage.

The controversy, however, does not evolve so much from the realization of this program (which has, in fact, been successfully carried out, in part, in recent years), as it does from the underlying conflict. The opposition seems far more concerned with Iran's cultural and political identities than with the Shah's economic measures, however controversial these may appear.

The Shah's reforms have been restricted in several areas. Most of the lands already redistributed in Iran belonged either to the state or to the Shah himself; only a very small percentage of the vast, private estates have been affected. Profit-sharing in factories is still far from being fully enforced, but even when it is, only a microscopic segment of Iran will be affected, because of the minute size of her industry. The break-up of trusts and fiduciaries, which has been described as a major cause for discontent among "religious fanatics," is nothing new among Muslim countries; Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and others have dissolved such trusts without any repercussions. In fact, in all those countries, as in Iran, religious and charitable

trusts were not affected, and the break-up of private trusts enjoyed wide public support. The emancipation of women, which has also been credited with provoking wrath among the clergy, is nothing new in Iran. In fact, the Shah's sister, Princess Ashraff, is probably the most powerful political figure in all of Iran. The sale of state-owned factories to the public has, so far, failed to achieve its objective. The state has only forced certain large landowners to exchange some of their property for a share in some factory, instead of paying for the seized property. The result, so far, has been to place those sectors of Iran's industry in incompetent hands.

ELEMENTS OF CONFLICT

Indeed, the underlying elements of the conflict in Iran are to be found elsewhere. They can be found in the severe social impact usually created by abnormally accelerated industrialization, in the false assumption among ruling Iranians that Westernization and modernization require a complete break with the past, and even contempt for it, and in centuries-old, shady political practices, unorthodox governing principles, and questionable goals and ideals.

The Westernization of Iran is, in fact, the key to the entire situation. For centuries, Iran remained in total isolation from the West. Unlike Turkey, the Levant and Egypt, Iran had only token contacts with European ideas. Iranians, more than other Middle Easterners, mistrusted Westerners. Shrouded by Shiite Islam, and filled with the phantoms of an illustrious, but far, faraway past, they never even felt a need for such contacts. Then, more than half a century ago, Western ideas suddenly caught up with them. Somehow, through foreign publications, books, foreign travelers, and the proximity of Turkish progressive movements, the Iranians came to realize that the Shah could actually be bound by something called a constitution. That sudden awakening eventually led to the establishment of the present Pahlevi dynasty.

Shah Riza Pahlevi, the founder of the dynasty, was well-intentioned. He admired the West and hoped to recast Iran into a

Western mold. He liberalized education, built railroads, reorganized the government, imported European experts and advisors, and instituted economic and social reforms. Then, believing that Iran's identification with Islam and the Arabs was the principal source of social stagnation and cultural inertia, he began a drive to "Iranize Iran."

During that forceful drive, Iran's history was rewritten in order to represent the Arab conquest of Iran as a calamity, and the Arabs themselves as the destroyers of Iranian culture and its outstanding civilization. The Muslim clergy became despised and was mistreated. Arabic words were eliminated from the Iranian language. Iranian intellectuals found a new source of national pride in the ancient Sasanids, while Zoroastrianism, a despised religious minority for more than a millennium, suddenly acquired prominence as a relic of ancient Iranian heritage.

HOSTILITY TO THE WEST

Having thus decreed the uprooting of Arabicism in Iran, Shah Riza created an enormous vacuum in the intimate lives of all Iranians. In order to fill that vacuum, he emphasized nationalism. But while many intellectuals embraced the new order with great enthusiasm, the vast majority of the people came to regard Westernization as irreconcilable with Islam. Such a conclusion, as anyone who knows Iran can tell, is sufficient to defeat anything in that country. In fact, among the common people in Iran, about 80 per cent of the entire population, the daily influence of the local *Mullah* (religious leader) is far greater than that of the rulers in faraway Teheran, however impressed the common man may be with his newly-acquired piece of land.

Within this context, in 1941, came a unique dramatization, the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran. The occupation may have been a strategic necessity of the war against Germany, but to the malcontent in Iran it was further evidence that Shah Riza's reforms were a failure. His emphasis on Westernization, most Iranians felt, not only disrupted old traditions but also endangered Iran's political

independence. They argued that Westernization brought "corrupt" Western ideas and even Western physical presence into Iran.

The Communists played a major role in manufacturing these arguments, but the people, nevertheless, were convinced by them. Thus, when Shah Mohammed Pahlevi launched his "white revolution" in the mid-1950's, the people remembered his father's policies—this time, however, against a background far more somber than that of the 1930's. This time, the intellectuals were not unanimous in their support of Westernization. The clergy had become more sophisticated and more dynamic. The politicians had begun to detect in the situation great opportunities for self-fulfillment. The Arabicists, inspired by the new dynamism of Arab nationalism, had become more aware of their cultural and political identities.

In most Asian countries, too little reform, too late, has caused revolutions. But in Iran, it is too much reform, too soon, that causes unrest. It is ironical that in Saudi Arabia, the world's most absolute monarchy should have a better chance of survival than monarchy in Iran.

THE LITERACY CORPS

While the Literacy Corps is the least controversial of the new projects in Iran, it is probably the most successful of the Shah's entire six-point program, and the soundest way to achieve a "white revolution."

The Literacy Corps, an Iranian version of the United States' War on Poverty, now includes teachers, doctors, dentists, pharmacists, veterinarians, social workers, and (soon) civil planners, sanitation experts, and many others specialized in civil development. Its purpose is to teach the peasants how to read and write, how to care for their health problems, how to bring up children, how to build a better hut and, in short, how to become useful, enlightened citizens.

This is the most significant approach to Iran's chronic problems. Not only does it eliminate the elements of social explosion in Iran, but also enables the vastest majority of the people, the peasantry, to put their agri-

cultural gains to better advantage. Eventually, it may even awaken in them a dormant sense of civic duty.

The peasantry in Iran is as economically helpless as it is politically useless in the new kind of nation which the Shah is hoping to establish. Whether or not the peasant owns and works "his own land" seems at this point very meaningless. Last year the Agricultural Bank made small loans to new landowning peasants totaling more than \$50 million. However, most experts felt that half that amount would have served an equal purpose had the peasants known how to appropriate their funds and how to channel them toward maximum advantage. Some of the peasants, for example, spent part of their loans marrying off their elder sons; others (the majority) received seeds and machinery which they hardly knew how to utilize; still others, who were more curious, took their tools and machines apart "to see how they worked" and were unable to put them back together again, thus wasting valuable property. Such people, it seems, need education far more than they need land.

Here again, the issue is obscured by the basically political nature of modernization. The Shah, understandably, hopes for the support of the peasantry, for peasants are the ultimate prize in the struggle for political supremacy in Iran. However, he has alienated so many elements of Iranian politics in order to please the elusive peasant that peasant support would hardly mean anything, even if the peasantry were to be miraculously turned into an active instrument of imperial policies.

The traditional rulers of Iran, the aristocracy, already mistrust the Shah and consider him a traitor to his class. Such animosity

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This author indicates that the "liberation" resulting from the revolutionary era in Iraq has been a mixed blessing. "In the turmoil which Iraq has experienced since 1958 . . . its human and its economic resources have suffered inevitable depletion" and the constitutional monarchy has been "replaced by an even harsher authoritarianism of the military or party."

Iraq: Seven Years of Revolution

By GEORGE LENCZOWSKI

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SINCE THE OVERTHROW of the Hashimite monarchy in 1958, Iraq has been ruled, successively, by three revolutionary regimes: the Abdul Karim Kassem regime (July 14, 1958–February 8, 1963), the Baath party regime (February 8, 1963–November 18, 1963), and the regime of Abdul Salam Aref (November 18, 1963, to the present). These seven years of revolutionary experience have been rich in turmoil, violence, and sudden reorientations of policy.

Broadly speaking, Iraq's revolutions belong to the general revolutionary upheaval characteristic of the Arab world since the early 1950's. As such they have much in common with the revolutionary movements in such countries as Egypt, Syria, and Algeria. However, the physical and demographic framework of Iraq is so different from the framework of the other countries mentioned that it could not fail to influence the quality and course of revolutions in Iraq.

Iraq is an underpopulated country, divided into the Arab-inhabited plain in the center and the south, and the Kurdish-inhabited highlands in the north. Its Arab population is, in turn, divided into a Shia and a Sunni group, the former somewhat larger

but less advanced than the latter. Tribal organization and tribal loyalties are still prevalent in the rural and desert areas.¹ The sense of national identity among its three major population groups is rather weak, a fact which manifests itself more in terms of contrast with the Arab peoples outside of Iraq than in terms of actual inner cohesion or lack of it. The country is rich in water, supplied in abundance by the Tigris-Euphrates system, and it possesses considerable oil resources, the latter responsible for an annual revenue of about \$300 million.

Virtually all of these features can be contrasted with the corresponding ones in Egypt, whose sedentary and homogeneous peasant mass dwells in an easily controlled flatland of the Nile Delta and whose natural resources neither suffice to give its teeming millions a decent standard of living, nor carry any promise of substantial improvement. Considerable contrasts may also be drawn between Iraq on the one hand and Syria or Algeria on the other. Consequently, while sharing a good deal with other revolutionary regimes, Iraq differs from them so substantially as to warrant a separate inquiry into the nature and development of its political destiny.

To gain a clearer understanding of Iraq's political developments, it may be useful to compare its situation since 1958 with the pre-

¹ For a systematic description of Iraq's land, population, and resources, see George L. Harris, and others, *Iraq* (New Haven, Conn.: HRAF Press, 1958).

revolutionary era and, in addition, to identify the major differences among the three revolutionary regimes which have succeeded each other since 1958. To assure a reasonably full coverage of the major changes in the life of the country, any such comparison should take into account the following five sectors: governmental and political process, social change, the economy, the country's Arab policy, and its broader foreign policy.

THE HASHIMITE ERA

In political terms, prerevolutionary Iraq could be described as a constitutional monarchy, with a strong authoritarian-oligarchical deviation evident especially in the decade of the 1950's. The authoritarian trend was exemplified by the combined, but not always harmonious, role played by Iraq's elder statesman, Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, and Emir Abdul Ilah, the King's uncle and Crown Prince.² The erosion, bordering on suspension, of the democratic process in Iraq made it necessary for the government to rely on the army and the police as major props of the regime. However, Nuri's was essentially a civilian government using the army as an instrument of its power. Its authoritarian tendency did not completely obliterate the reality of political competition among the various political parties whose existence and whose leaders and press organs were known in spite of the curbs and suppressions.³

The general orientation of the Nuri regime was conservative but not retrograde. Nuri did not seem to be unduly disturbed by the socio-economic inequalities of the Iraqi society. He believed that what Iraq needed

² For a political history of Iraq, see Majid Khadduri, *Independent Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics from 1932 to 1958* (2nd ed., New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1960). See also George Grassmuck, "The Electoral Process in Iraq, 1952-1958," *The Middle East Journal*, Autumn, 1960.

³ A first-hand account of this period may be found in the memoirs of the U. S. Ambassador to Iraq, Waldemar J. Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said, 1954-1958* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964). See also Lord Birdwood, *Nuri al-Said: A Study in Arab Leadership* (London: Cassell, 1959).

⁴ For a comprehensive study of the development problems by a Western expert, see Lord Salter, *The Development of Iraq* (Baghdad: Iraq Development Board, 1955).

was not a radical reslicing of the "cake" but a concerted effort to increase the cake's size —a policy justly deemed feasible in view of the impressive resources of the country. He felt that once this was accomplished, the more balanced distribution of wealth would follow without resorting to any potentially dangerous steps. In conformance with this theory, major emphasis was placed on planned development administered by a nonpolitical development board which included vote-wielding foreign experts on finance and irrigation. The law provided that 70 per cent of the oil revenue was to be earmarked for development. With such funds at its disposal, by 1957 the board could boast of considerable achievements, the most notable of which were the construction of the Wadi Tharthar Dam on the Tigris and the Ramadi Dam on the Euphrates.⁴

Socially, the regime represented a mixture of implied privilege for wealthier groups and considerable opportunity for those middle class members who acquired good education and competence. In contrast to Egypt, prerevolutionary Iraq did not have an overabundance of the true intelligentsia. Half-educated elements, neither capable of performing any useful intellectual, technical or executive function, nor willing to lower themselves to artisan or manual work, constituted a shifting and perennially discontented class. They often provided the rank and file of the opposition parties and the "cannon-flesh" for the occasional street demonstrations. While Nuri's attitude vacillated between a fear of the disruptive tendencies of this group and a haughty disregard of its significance, he did not follow any consistent and long-range policy to cope with it. Further, his regime suffered from the usual degree of corruption and nepotism characteristic of the Middle Eastern environment, although the importance of this weakness was somewhat minimized due to the relative abundance of revenue.

In the field of foreign policy, Nuri aligned himself with the West and became one of the chief architects of the Baghdad Pact. This put him at odds with Egypt's Gama

Abdel Nasser and, more broadly, with Pan-Arab oriented nationalists at home and abroad, leading eventually to Iraq's isolation from the rest of the Arab world, except for Jordan with which a federative agreement was concluded in 1958. His disregard of hostile Arab reaction to his foreign policies and his nonresponsiveness to the socio-economic expectations of the younger and less privileged urban groups in Iraq were the two main reasons for Nuri's growing unpopularity and eventual downfall.⁵

He refused to see the persistence of Iraq's native national-revolutionary trend which manifested itself through such explosions as the Ahali-supported Bakr Sidqi coup of 1936, the Rashid Ali revolt of 1941, the Portsmouth Treaty riots of 1948, the bloody disturbances of 1952, and the violent reaction to the Suez aggression in 1956. He could have used effective arguments against his enemies by pointing out, for example, that both Nasser and the Saudis had entered into compromise agreements with major Western powers, which allowed the presence of the latter's military forces on their territories. However, Nuri was curiously inept in the field of propaganda and made no major effort to counterattack his Arab critics, which proved an important contributing factor to the demise of his regime.

THE KASSEM ERA

When General Kassem's military coup put an end to Nuri's life and era, it opened a veritable Pandora's box of long-suppressed forces. Of these the most militant were the Communists, the Baathists, and the less well organized but intensely committed Nasserites. Furthermore, two long-standing opposition groups reemerged: the Istiqlal party (nationalist and broadly conservative) and the National-Democratic party, a socialist heir

to the Ahali movement of the 1930's. None of these groups took part in the planning and execution of the coup of July 14, 1958, but their previous anti-Nuri activity was responsible for the mental climate of opposition which nurtured the attitudes of Kassem and his military associates.

Representatives of the above-mentioned groups all found a place in Kassem's first cabinet and were joined by some army officers as well as a member of the Kurdish minority. Such a cabinet might have conveyed the impression that Kassem genuinely desired the restoration of the democratic process and multiparty system. This, however, was patently not the case. His rule became that of undisguised military dictatorship. True enough, Kassem made promises of reviving party life. But when, after twenty-odd months, he formally decreed the right to form parties, only three obtained licenses as acceptable to the dictator. And these were relatively minor groups which were certainly not representative of the broad range of political forces in Iraq.⁶

On his part, Kassem did not attempt to set up his own party and preferred to rely on the army, the police, and the Popular Resistance Forces (revolutionary militia) as the mainstays of his regime. He was not, however, oblivious to the existence of organized political movements and did his best to manipulate them for his own benefit without granting them official recognition.

His first major preoccupation was the proposed union with Egypt and Syria (then recently merged into a single state), which was advocated by his close associate, Colonel Abdul Salam Aref, and the pro-Nasser elements. Kassem resisted the idea, removed Aref, and had him later sentenced to death, though not executed. Simultaneously, he gave free hand to the Communists to attack and intimidate the Nasserites and the Baathists.

This partial reliance on Communist organization and mob-power paved the way for serious Communist infiltration of the government, schools, unions and professional associations, radio and propaganda apparatus,

⁵ For an acute analysis of the darker sides of the Nuri regime, see Caractacus, *Revolution in Iraq: An Essay in Comparative Public Opinion* (London: Gollancz, 1959).

⁶ Unable to enjoy full freedom of action, the National-Democratic Party suspended its activities. The party's statement to this effect may be found in *Al-Bayan* (Baghdad), July 2, 1962.

and the Popular Resistance Forces.⁷ A revolutionary tribunal to try the leading figures of the "exterminated regime" and other enemies of the Republic was formed under the presidency of the notorious and pro-Communist Colonel Fadhil Abbas Mahdawi, Kassem's relative. It added to the revolutionary effervescence in the country through 1958 and 1959 and, by distorting and dramatizing the evils of the past era, it played into the hands of the Communists. The latter, operating openly or as the Peace Partisans and in close alliance with Kurdish nationalists, attempted to seize power in the provincial capitals of Mosul in April, 1959, and Kirkuk in July of the same year. These attempts took a heavy toll of lives. Communist armed detachments attacked the homes of the upper bourgeoisie, committed excesses including torture and dismemberment of their victims, and, in Mosul, set up a revolutionary court, headed by a cobbler, which meted out instant justice to their enemies.

Reluctant as he was to break with the Communists, Kassem felt compelled to put gradual curbs on their activities for the sake of self-preservation. The nationalist and moderate elements in the country took every opportunity to praise the dictator on this issue. However, his cautiously anti-Communist line (he always referred to them publicly as "forces of anarchy," never by their real name) did not win him back the alienated Baathists and Nasserites. Thus, in terms of any organized political support, Kassem's isolation was steadily increasing with the passage of time. In the autumn of 1961, he was challenged by the outbreak of the Kurdish rebellion in the north. Neither the military action of his army, nor the alternating threats and promises of amnesty and

⁷ For an account of this phase, see George Lenzowski; *The Middle East in World Affairs* (3rd ed., Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1962), Chap. VII, esp. pp. 297-308.

⁸ For a relatively up-to-date account, see Lettie M. Wenner, "Arab-Kurdish Rivalries in Iraq," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 17, Nos. 1 and 2, 1963.

⁹ See General A. K. Kassem's Speech on Iraq's First Labor Day, May 1, 1959, *Principles of 14th July Revolution* (Baghdad: The Times Press, 1959).

limited autonomy succeeded in settling the conflict. Toward the end of his rule the Kurds, under Mullah Mustafa Barzani, were supreme in large areas of the north.⁸

Thus, in terms of political process, the revolution did not bring the expected freedom. If anything, the authoritarianism of the Kassem era was harsher, more arbitrary, less predictable, and more intolerant of the opposition than the conservative semi-authoritarianism of Nuri and the Hashimite monarchy. Moreover, the open and televised proceedings of the Mahdawi court were a travesty on justice probably unequalled in the history of the revolutions.

With regard to the social structure and process, the Kassem era did not effect a massive change. The landowners and the upper bourgeoisie lost their political power, but, except for certain local instances, were allowed to retain their properties and businesses. And, although they suffered occasional harrassment and intimidation, they were not uprooted and destroyed as a class. Both Kassem and his propagandists frequently spoke of the new era of the common man and exalted the virtues of the peasants, workers, and the revolutionary intellectuals, but much of it was mere phraseology.⁹ His regime undoubtedly gave greater opportunity to the middle and lower middle class elements as well as to the (partly overlapping) half-educated intelligentsia with no marketable skills. But this could not be regarded as a radical opening of the gates of social mobility which, insofar as the middle class was concerned, was already in evidence during the Nuri era.

The agrarian reform decree in September, 1958, had the dual purpose of social and economic emancipation of the peasants. However, it suffered from delays, red tape, and mismanagement, and made little impact on the social process in the country. Peasant associations were formed, but the movement was artificial, served primarily political purposes, and made no discernible difference on the social scene.

In the economic sector, Iraq under Kassem suffered a definite setback. The bourgeoisie

was sufficiently frightened by the Communist excesses and general uncertainty to stop any further investment; in fact much of the capital fled the country. The vacuum created was not adequately filled by government initiative. Although a few factories were installed by technicians from the Communist bloc countries, the official propaganda presented an exaggerated image of their importance.¹⁰ The old development board, one of the few successful organizations of this type in the Middle East, was disbanded, contracts granted before 1958 to Western engineering firms were cancelled, and their experts removed. The new ministry of development, entrusted to a succession of radically-inclined politicians, presented a picture of chaos and confusion. The strict rule about the division of oil revenue between development and current administration was rapidly thrown overboard, and much politically motivated, reckless spending took its place.

In the field of foreign policy, Kassem effected a major reorientation. Severing Iraq's close ties with the West, he proclaimed a new policy of positive neutralism, nonalignment, anti-imperialism, and Afro-Asian solidarity.¹¹ Like Nasser's, his neutralism was hostile to the West. It found its most concrete expression in a series of aid-and-trade and cultural agreements with Russia and the Soviet bloc countries. When Kassem imposed curbs on the local Communist party in the wake of the Kirkuk episode, his relations with the Communist states suffered a temporary strain but soon returned to friendly normalcy.

In the latter stages of his rule, Kassem gave the appearance of feverishly seeking some foreign issues with which to direct the attention of his disenchanted people from the sad state of domestic affairs. In June, 1961, he suddenly laid claim to Kuwait, asserting the

latter to be part of the territory of Iraq. This move brought him into the conflict with the Arab League, under whose aegis joint Arab forces landed in Kuwait to protect its newly won sovereignty.¹² In another dramatic move, Kassem broke off negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company and decreed, on December 11, 1961, seizure of over 99 per cent of the company's concession area.¹³ By doing this, he risked a retaliatory slowdown in production while, at the same time, putting a halt to the Company's exploration activities. Neither of those two moves were well received. On the contrary, a suspicion was gaining ground that he was losing his rational powers. Always armed and seldom leaving his office, where he ate and slept as well, Kassem behaved as though he expected a deadly blow at any time. Ultimately, his fears proved founded: on February 8, 1963, after four and a half years in power, he was overthrown and killed during a coup effected by the Baath party in alliance with a disaffected army group.

THE BAATH RULE

The assumption of power by the Baath (the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party) did not convert Iraq into a democracy. Under Baath rule, personal dictatorship gave place to a collective party leadership. The party constituted the Iraqi branch of a Pan-Arab party whose general headquarters was in Damascus, its birthplace, and preached freedom, socialism, and unity for the Arab world. It possessed a tight organization experienced in undercover activities during the periods of repression. Despite its advent to power, it only partly revealed the names of its top leaders, and its activities combined elements of openness and secrecy. General Hassan al-Bakr, a Baath party member, became premier. Because the basic decision-making regarding state affairs was done in inner party councils, Iraq's political process represented a dualism of the official government structure and a parallel party organization.

The Baath government coopted Colonel Abdul Salam Aref (who was spared his life

¹⁰ See *The Iraqi Revolution in Its Fourth Year* (Baghdad: The Times Press, 1962), p. 29 ff.

¹¹ See *The Iraqi Revolution in Its Second Year* (Baghdad: The Times Press, 1960), p. 191 ff.

¹² For an official Iraqi version of this conflict, see *The Iraqi Revolution in Its Fourth Year*, op. cit., pp. 705-708.

¹³ Text of the Law No. 80 may be found in the *Official Gazette*, No. 616, Dec. 12, 1961.

under Kassem) as its collaborator and entrusted him with the presidency of the Republic. His political role in this position was limited. However, despite the heavy penetration of the army by the Baath, he succeeded in keeping in touch with a substantial number of non-Baathist followers, which eventually proved useful to him.

Political, as opposed to economic or social, considerations dominated the thinking and policies of the party leadership. And the problem of Arab unity enjoyed primacy among the political concerns. In this connection, the Baath advent to power (also through a coup) in Syria—just one month after the revolution in Iraq—proved of tremendous importance. Long suppressed and harrassed, the Baath found itself in power in two adjoining countries of the Fertile Crescent while in Egypt another champion of Arab unity, Nasser, controlled the destinies of that nation. Their commitment to unity being clear and long-standing, it was natural that, without much delay, all three governments were to convene in Cairo to negotiate the realization of their cherished dream.

However, despite their unquestioned devotion to the principle of unity, the April, 1963, Cairo conference encountered considerable obstacles. It should be pointed out that the enthusiasm which the Baath party had displayed toward President Nasser in the mid-1950's had substantially evaporated during the difficult era of the Syro-Egyptian union, from February, 1958, to September, 1961. In 1959, the party had been denied any share in power in the United Arab Republic, and its leaders deprived (by dismissal or voluntary resignation) of the high offices they had initially held in the union. With this background, the Syrian and Iraqi Baathists clashed with Nasser over three

major issues: (a) equality vs. inequality of the three partners in the contemplated united Arab state, (b) collective vs. personal leadership, and (c) the monopoly of the Baath representation of Syria vs. the concept of a broader front which would include elements dependent on Nasser.¹⁴

The latter problem proved the most difficult of all and almost wrecked the conference, especially as the Iraqi Baathists loyally supported their Syrian party comrades on all issues, thereby increasing Nasser's annoyance. The union accord eventually concluded constituted a compromise couched in terms which, on most delicate points, required careful interpretation. Such interpretations began to vary between Cairo and the two Baathist delegations shortly after their return home. As a consequence, the agreement, even with reference to its transitional provisions, was never implemented. Instead, a campaign of mutual recrimination began between the Baathists and Cairo, a campaign punctuated by a few abortive attempts of the Nasserites, in both Syria and Iraq, to seize power.

The first and foremost enemy of the Baath in Iraq was the Communist party, well remembered for its cruelties under the Kassem regime. Now, another group came under attack: the followers of Nasser. Fearful lest Nasser's followers effect a coup, the Iraqi Baathists sought close cooperation with their Syrian counterparts and, on September 2, 1963, announced an agreement to establish unity between the two countries.

By this time it was evident that the Baath in Iraq was rent by a profound ideological dissension. Its left wing, rallied under the forceful leadership of Ali Saleh al-Saadi, clashed with its moderate group headed by Taleb Shabib and Hazem Jawad. In October, the Baath parties from various Arab countries held their Sixth National Congress in Damascus, where the Saadi group wielded considerable influence and succeeded in having most of its views adopted in the final resolutions.¹⁵ But Saadi did not limit himself to ideological advocacy. He began building around himself a structure of power pri-

¹⁴ For two versions of the tripartite unity conference in Cairo, see Riyad Taha, *Muhadher Muhadathat al-Wahda* (Beirut: Al-Kifah Press, 1963); and *Muhadher Muhadathat al-Wahda*, with an Introduction by Mohammed Hassanein Haikal, (Cairo: Muassasat Al-Ahram, Aug., 1963).

¹⁵ Text in *Communiqué du Sixième Congrès National du Parti Baath Arab Socialiste*, pamphlet by courtesy of the National Command of the Baath party, Damascus, 1963.

marily resting on the armed militia, the National Guard. The zeal and excesses of this group, reminiscent of Kassem's Popular Resistance Forces, antagonized not only the broad segments of Iraqi population but the army as well and, in early November, certain moderate Baathist leaders, in connivance with some army officers, succeeded in removing Saadi and deporting him and his few followers to Spain.

Faced with these serious difficulties in Iraq, the Baath National Command (located in Damascus) sent its Secretary General, Michel Aflaq, accompanied by General Hafez, to Baghdad to resolve the crisis. Their intervention came too late: the split in the Iraqi Baath produced, on November 18, a coup d'état by the pro-Nasserite President Aref and his personal followers in the army. The Baathist National Guard put up a desperate resistance but, after a day of fighting, it was overcome by the superior army forces.

Thus ended the eight-month-long Baath rule in Iraq. It had been too short to leave much impact on the socio-economic situation in the country. In the field of foreign policy, the Baath remained faithful to the standard slogans of modern Arab nationalism but, in practice, its neutralism was less hostile to the West. By contrast, its relations with Russia underwent considerable strain, largely because of the harsh measures applied to local Communists.

The main reason for the Baath party downfall in Baghdad was the organizational weakness of its regional Iraqi branch. In contrast to the more experienced and older leadership of the Syrian branch, the party leaders in Iraq were very young, impetuous, overconfident and overambitious. Furthermore, the party's history in Iraq had less continuity than in Syria. While the technique of building up an armed militia as an instrument of power was strategically sound, the party neglected to scrutinize sufficiently its membership and exercise adequate control over its activities. As a result, the National Guard evolved from a body of idealistically inclined students into an organization attracting an ever-increasing number of thug-like individ-

duals from the slum areas, bent on robbery, rape, and violence under the guise of radical social commitment.

AREF'S MILITARY REGIME

When Colonel Aref (soon promoted to Marshal by the revolutionary council) overthrew the Baath government, he claimed that his main target was the "un-national" National Guard which had perverted the purity of the revolution. In fact, some of the Baathist army officers, including the air force commander General Hardan Takriti, cooperated with him in the coup d'état. Consequently, in the early weeks of his rule he refrained from attacking the Baath as such, perhaps in the hope of winning over the moderate group in the party. With the passage of time, however, he abandoned this restraint and began openly attacking the Baath as a whole and sent into exile men such as Takriti, civilian and military Baathists alike.

In terms of the internal political process, Aref's government displayed similarities with the Kassem era: it also was a non-party military regime. Collective leadership characteristic of the Baath era was abandoned in favor of the new president's personal rule, bolstered by a coterie of close followers in the army. Five officers holding dominant positions in the regime under Aref's leadership were his brother, General Abdur Rahman Aref, acting chief-of-staff; Premier General Taher Yahya (formerly associated with the Baath); General Rashed Musleh, minister of the interior and military governor-general; Brigadier Subhi Abdul Hamid, minister of foreign affairs; and Brigadier Abdul Karim Farhan, minister of national guidance. Like Aref himself, the latter two were strong admirers of President Nasser.

Thus, in contrast to Kassem's policy, Aref's regime had a definite pro-Egyptian orientation. Its official platform was to advocate an early Arab union, and to condemn both the late Kassem and the Baath for perverting and sabotaging this idea. The visit which Marshal Aref paid to Nasser in May, 1964, to attend the inauguration of the Aswan Dam, provided an opportunity to move from

slogans to deeds and, on May 26, the two presidents reached an agreement providing for union between the two countries to be achieved in stages through the formation of joint bodies.¹⁶ The highest of these was to be a joint presidential council which came into being in the fall of 1964, following the Second Arab Summit Meeting.

Despite the clear Iraqi initiative to effect a union and the seeming Egyptian willingness to respond, President Nasser did not appear anxious to rush matters with undue haste. Perhaps his earlier experience with Syria had taught him caution. His policy seemed to follow the line that any Arab country desiring union should, before uniting with Egypt, undergo an internal transformation which would bring it closer to the Egyptian political and economic pattern. This explains a number of changes which took place in Iraq after the May union agreement.

For one thing, after his Cairo talks, President Aref openly favored creating a single party regime to be modelled after Egypt's Arab Socialist Union. On July 14, 1964, the sixth anniversary of the original revolution, such a party was officially launched with a name identical to its Egyptian counterpart. By the same token, while Aref had claimed—ever since his November coup—that his regime was dedicated to the concept of Arab socialism, his interpretation of the concept was vastly different from that of Cairo. In the first place, he asserted that Arab socialism derived its inspiration from Islam, in contrast to the secular accents stressed in Cairo. In the second, he strongly emphasized the vital role of free enterprise and private property. However, his talks in Cairo brought about a sudden *volte-face* in his policy and, on July 14 he issued, without forewarning, a series of presidential decrees nationalizing an impressive number of banks, insurance companies, and private enterprises.

These two steps—the creation of the Arab Socialist Union and the nationalization de-

crees—seemed to fulfill Cairo prerequisites to closer organic links between the two states. What followed could be described as the multiple intensification of contacts and co-operation between the two revolutionary regimes. Egyptian officers, accompanied by moderately sized military units, began appearing in increasing numbers in Iraq and some of them participated in joint maneuvers. A variety of experts from Cairo became attached to Iraqi government departments, although the process appeared more selective and cautious than was the case in Syria between 1958 and 1961, and hundreds of Egyptian teachers—this perennially exportable commodity—were given contracts to serve in the Iraqi school system. Simultaneously, internal political controls were tightened. This was especially visible in the press sector, where strict censorship, revocation of licenses, and launching of government-subsidized papers brought about a uniformity strongly resembling the Egyptian model.

There was also an attempt to emulate Egypt with regard to the formal state structure. On May 3, 1964, the country was given a provisional constitution which proclaimed the Iraqi Republic as a "democratic socialist state deriving the rudiments of its democracy and socialism from the Arab heritage and the spirit of Islam." The Iraqi people were declared to be "a part of the Arab nation." "Comprehensive Arab unity" was described as the aim. And, in conformance with Aref's repeated references to religion, "Islam is the religion of the state and is the main basis of its constitution." Although the constitution provided for an eventual election of a National Assembly, it vested all power during the transitional period in the hands of the President and the National Council of Revolutionary Command.¹⁷

As constitutions issued by an authoritarian fiat do, this one had at most a declaratory-ideological significance and could not be seriously considered as a charter truly protecting the people against the arbitrary exercise of power. But coming, as it did, in the spring of 1964, when the U.A.R. (March 24), Syria (April 25), and Yemen (April 28)

¹⁶ Text in *Al-Thawrat al-Arabiyyah* (Baghdad), May 27, 1964.

¹⁷ From an English text of the Constitution by courtesy of the Iraqi Ministry of National Guidance.

adopted their socialist-oriented "presidential" constitutions, it helped Iraq signify that it belonged to the "liberated" Arab countries and was in the mainstream of the Arab national-revolutionary movement.

In the turmoil which Iraq has experienced since 1958, both its human and its economic resources have suffered inevitable depletion. Wave after wave of purges instituted by the succession of regimes have effectively eliminated groups of educated individuals from potentially beneficial service to the state and to development. As for development itself, the paradox has been that despite the commitment of all three revolutionary regimes to a planned economy, rational economic planning free from political intervention and its sustained execution have not fared well as compared with the Nuri era.

Figures on economic growth have been so manipulated by the successive dictatorships as to make distinction between fact and propaganda most difficult. The installation in power of the current Aref regime is of too recent a date, and the concentration of its leaders on political crises and issues (domestic and Arab) is too intense, to expect rapid advances in the economic sector. However, on January 18, 1965, the government announced a Five Year Plan of development (1965-1969) whose basic objective was to be "to remedy the economic weakness resulting from one single form of national revenue, namely, oil." The plan called for a total expenditure of I.D. (Iraqi Dinars) 820 million.¹⁸ It fore-saw an 8 per cent annual growth in national income (as compared with 6.5 per cent during the past ten years) and called for the doubling of the national income in nine years and of the per capita income in thirteen years. The plan's share from oil revenues was expected to reach I.D. 385 million over the five-year period.

The likelihood of this plan being faithfully implemented depends, primarily, on political stability. Should the latter be established, the government is perfectly capable, considering its high oil revenues, of channelling

I.D. 550 million toward development. As for the private sector, much depends on the encouragement of private investors and their trust of the government in power. In view of the abrupt method whereby nationalization decrees were issued despite previous firm assurances to the contrary, the willingness of investors to risk their capital in a socialist-oriented and politically unchecked system represents a truly unknown factor.

CONCLUSION

It is not easy to present a clear balance sheet of the revolutionary era in Iraq. In the political sector, the constitutional monarchy with a strong authoritarian deviation was replaced by an even harsher authoritarianism of the military or party. The imperfect and enforced stability of the Nuri era was followed by a period of considerable instability, although we must refrain from issuing a premature verdict on the latest regime. Iraq under Nuri was attacked by Arab nationalists for isolating itself from the mainstream of Arab life. In this respect the situation has changed radically; yet, despite professed intentions to achieve Arab unity, Iraq still remains a separate sovereign state. However this, too, may change if the present trend of forging close ties with the U.A.R. is intensified.

In social terms, the revolutionary period has contributed to the advance of the salaried intelligentsia, civil and military. (However, it is a moot question whether the same phenomenon would not have occurred had the Nuri regime stayed in power. Nuri himself was a typical representative of this class and could claim no aristocratic antecedents or

(Continued on page 307)

George Lenczowski lived in the Middle East from 1938 to 1945 and has often revisited there since. His most recent books on the area include *Oil and State in the Middle East* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960) and *The Middle East in World Affairs* (3rd ed., Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962).

¹⁸ For data on this expenditure see al-Thawrat al-Arabiyyah, (Baghdad), January 19, 1965.

"Nasser's actions in the realm of foreign affairs often affect the entire Arab World, because of his position as the spokesman for Arab nationalists everywhere," writes this observer, pointing out that "Nasser's foreign policy basically is one of nonalignment—despite its pro-Soviet bias—and he has used it skillfully."

Nasser's Egypt

By GORDON H. TORREY
Consultant on Middle East Affairs

EGYPT IS THE DOMINANT Arab power, occupying a strategic position on the land bridge between Asia and Africa. Its Suez Canal is Europe's vital sea route to the Indian Ocean, the gateway to South and Southeast Asia. A population of 28 million, which increases about 750,000 a year, makes Egypt the most populous Arab state, yet only 3.5 per cent of its 380,000 square miles is inhabitable—a narrow corridor stretching over 700 miles along the Nile River.

Egypt's geographical size and large population, its 150,000-man military establishment, its comparatively advanced industrialization, and President Gamal Abdel Nasser's militant Arab nationalism make it the political, intellectual, and cultural center of the Arab world, as well as much of Africa. Egypt's traditional leadership of the Arab states is based on several factors: Cairo's propaganda organs (publishing, cinema and radio); the al-Azhar Mosque with its university, most influential in the Muslim world, and Nasser's revolutionary political concepts which sway both leaders and people throughout the Arab states. An important additional factor is Nasser's leadership of the Arabs against Israel. His "non-aligned" and "anti-colonialist" policies extend Egyptian influence to the world stage in a measure much larger than Egypt's size and economic resources ordinarily would warrant.

Nasser did not create Arab nationalism; but

he is its most effective exponent, not because of his Egyptian leadership role, but because he personifies Arab longings for unity and acceptance as equals by the world. Nasser's constant references to Arab "rights" and Arab "dignity" and his ability to "twist the lion's tail"—especially the West's—makes him a formidable force in the Arab world. Examples of this are his deal for Soviet arms in 1955, the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, and his ability to turn the 1956 defeat at the hands of the Israelis into a political victory. The Soviet agreement was a slap at the West which gave the Arabs the great emotional satisfaction of having a foreign power align itself on their side against Israel.

Accompanying the quest for Arab unity has been a rise in social expectations by the Arab masses. Nasser, acutely aware of these longings, has capitalized on them with his "Arab socialism," although the concept was originated by the Syrian, Michel Aflaq, in his Baathist teachings ten years before Nasser came to power. Although not yet a coherent doctrine, Nasser's socialism envisages leveling of incomes, social justice, land reform, state ownership of the major means of production, an increase in foreign trade, and a large-scale state-directed development program. The Aswan Dam and its land reclamation scheme is the most notable example of this and has become a symbol of progress to all Egyptians

The revolution that overthrew Egypt's old ruling pasha class and ended foreign financial power brought to the fore a new modernizing class drawn from the army officer corps, Western trained technicians, and some workers and peasants. This group comprises only a small percentage of the Egyptian people, most of whom as yet have been relatively little touched by the social revolution going on around them. One of Nasser's greatest problems is how to reconcile state direction of affairs with broad participation by the people. So far the Arab Socialist Union, his third attempt at "popularizing" the regime, has made only limited progress. The Egyptian people, ruled from above from time immemorial, can hardly be expected readily to understand the democratic process; they remain comparatively apathetic about even limited participation.

THE REGIME

When the Free Officers led by Nasser overthrew the royal regime in 1952, they regarded themselves as leaders of a protest movement and did not envisage assuming power. They soon became disillusioned with the old-line politicians, however, and decided that all political opposition must be eliminated and that Egypt must be ruled by men who would bring a new order based on social justice for the Egyptian people. This led to immediate agrarian reform, but business and industry were left untouched. As time went on, the regime became more and more involved with economic problems connected with the development program. It seemed to Nasser and his close supporters that the logical next step should be socialism. This culminated in the nationalization of all larger industry, banks, and insurance companies in July, 1961.¹

The new democratic society was to be based, not on the Marxist concept of a class dictatorship, but on an alliance of all laboring elements. Its advisory legislative organ has

come to be the National Assembly, half of whose seats are reserved for workers and farmers. Presiding over it is one of the original Free Officers and a Nasser confidant. Nasser remains President of the United Arab Republic.

Egypt, however, remains under the rule of the survivors of the original small group which carried out the coup. It is they who are in the key government posts and who carry out the policies. Nasser dominates the regime and makes the final decisions; the others are consulted on a continuing basis and are shifted from time to time.

While Egypt may be accurately termed a dictatorship, there has been remarkably little dissension within the original ruling group and, while police controls are strong, there has been no blood bath that so often accompanies revolutionary regimes. In fact, there have been no executions for strictly political opposition and few political prisoners.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

The Egyptian regime faces enormous social and economic problems. Massive poverty, widespread illiteracy, countless health problems, and extreme population pressure plague the regime. Faced with these, and lacking sufficient natural resources, Nasser has turned to rapid industrialization since the possibility of expanding agriculture is very limited, even with the new Aswan Dam.

Unfortunately, the Egyptian leaders have tried to do too much too quickly. They have drained foreign exchange reserves and borrowed heavily abroad. A simultaneous drive to raise living standards has complicated the problem. The growing middle class has come to expect many items regarded as essential in the West—refrigerators and other electrical appliances, a better diet, social services and other amenities. All of these cost scarce foreign exchange. In addition, some government-owned industries are inefficient and some necessities are priced below cost as a popularity measure. The regime has found it politically difficult to take the unpopular steps necessary to cut consumption.

An additional strain on economic resources

¹This step was instrumental in activating the Syrian army, which allied itself with a number of Syrian politicians, to carry out the coup which sundered the union with Egypt.

has been the maintenance of the large military establishment (the military budget is around \$300 million a year) and foreign adventures of various sorts—intervention in Yemen, support for “liberation” movements in the Middle East and Africa, and Egypt’s role in the Arabian and nonaligned world, including the holding of numerous conferences and a large-scale propaganda effort. In the final analysis, foreign and domestic political considerations have been given precedence over economic problems.

Agriculture, which supports about two-thirds of Egypt’s population, provides only about one-third of its national product. Because of perennial irrigation from the Nile River, double cropping is possible in some cases. Cotton is the country’s most important agricultural foreign exchange earner, bringing in about \$150 million a year, which pays for much of the extensive development program and Soviet arms.² Even with greater attention to the expansion of agriculture, there is almost no hope that the country can make itself self-sufficient in foodstuffs; the population growth is too large. Crop failures and fluctuating prices must also be considered.

Egyptian industry has expanded enormously since the overthrow of King Farouk and industrial exports are an important source of foreign exchange. All but the smallest firms are now state-owned. Industrial efficiency has been hampered to some extent, however, by the nationalization process, governmental red tape and considerable poor management. Prices, wages and profit distribution often have been based on political motivations, while management in many cases has been entrusted to former army officers as a reward for loyalty, rather than in recognition of management skills.

² The Soviet bloc has provided a market for Egyptian cotton and other agricultural commodities for which Egypt cannot always find customers in the West. The Suez Canal is the biggest earner of foreign exchange; bringing in about \$160 million a year, and increasing annually.

³ Capitalism in the Middle East has had little resemblance to that in the West. It has been unenlightened and based on landholdings and real estate to an overwhelming degree.


FOREIGN POLICY

Nasser’s actions in the realm of foreign relations often affect the entire Arab World, because of his position as the spokesman for Arab nationalists everywhere. This influence is so pervasive that other Arab leaders feel that they often must fall in line despite their private disagreement with his goals or methods.

While no *Mein Kampf*, Nasser’s *Philosophy of the Revolution* does give a good insight into his thinking about the world and Egypt’s place in it. Nasser views the world as a stage, with Egypt as one of the principal actors. This role is three-dimensional, described in Nasser’s language in terms of circles. The first of these is the Arab area with Arab unity as the main plot. Beyond this circle lies Africa, which Nasser envisages as the seat of struggle between white “imperialists” and the indigenous Negroes for possession of its riches. Encompassing these two circles is the world of Islam, also threatened by “imperialism.” In the past few years, Nasser appears to have expanded this conception of the third circle to include all non-Western and underdeveloped Western countries. The Communist world seems to lie half in and half out: at least the Asian satellites, such as North Korea and North Vietnam, are regarded as being members of the underdeveloped world threatened by Western “imperialism.”

Within the Arab world, Nasser’s goals have remained constant, although his tactics have varied. Overall, his objective is to oust any remaining Western economic or political presence. In addition, he seeks a social revolution along the lines of his Arab socialism. Kings, sheikhs, and sultans, along with capitalism, must go.³

Nasser’s first tactic was to attempt the exportation of the Egyptian revolution by subverting other Arab regimes. However, this failed and brought him into confrontation with the United States in Lebanon in 1958. Egypt’s union with Syria in early 1958 came about almost by accident, with the Syrians pressing union on a reluctant Nasser. He had to accept the burden or repudiate his role



as the foremost exponent of Arab unity. The Iraqi coup of July, 1958, was an indigenous movement, although Nasser helped considerably to create the atmosphere which brought it about.

Following the Syrian breakaway in September, 1961, Nasser's fortunes were at a low ebb. His attempt to export revolution to Yemen brought him into an almost intolerable situation. The fledgling Yemeni Republic immediately required Egyptian troop backing to survive royalist opposition. Proping up the republic has mired down about 50,000 Egyptian troops, with no end in sight. If Egyptian troops are withdrawn, Egyptian dominance will go with them and the republican regime as it is presently constituted will almost certainly be swamped. However, the longer the Egyptians remain, the more the Yemenis will resent them.

Saudi Arabia has viewed the Egyptian presence in Yemen as an intrusion on the Arabian Peninsula posing a threat to the Saudi regime. This has prompted the Saudis

to support the royalist Imam Badr against the Egyptian-dominated Yemeni republic, although Saudi-Yemeni relations were never cordial under the old Imamate. The Yemeni intervention has provided Nasser with a base from which to harass the South Arabian Federation and Britain's military base at Aden. Egyptian support of dissidents there has brought on a terrorist campaign in Aden and, possibly, set back plans for its independence.

Exploiting his role as an Arab nationalist leader, Nasser has managed to pressure other Arab states into giving lip service to his campaign against the British in Aden as a part of the Arab crusade against imperialism, although these leaders lack real interest in the Aden problem.

The Congo situation is the most recent example of Nasser's approach to non-Arab Africa. Although Egypt has no specific interests there, Nasser has aligned himself with other radical African states in support of the rebels and has cooperated in sending them

arms. This interference arises from his view that the Western "neo-imperialists" dominate the Congo regime and are attempting to reassert their control over the country's riches. In Nasser's eyes Tshombe is their puppet and must be ousted.

EGYPT AND ISRAEL

Most important to the Arab nationalists is Nasser's attitude toward Israel. The most powerful Arab state, with the largest and most effective army, Egypt leads Arab thinking on this subject. Nasser, who fully realizes Israeli military effectiveness, must adopt a stance sufficiently bellicose to sustain his role as the top Arab leader, yet not so belligerent as to provoke a repetition of the 1956 disaster to Egyptian arms. Since the Suez War, Egypt's military machine has grown in size and effectiveness. Yet Nasser has carefully avoided a direct confrontation with the Israelis, despite his often vociferous public statements. His greatest worry is that one of the other Arab states, especially Syria, might bring about an Israeli retaliatory blow which could force Egypt to rush to its defense.

Arab concern over Israeli diversion of some Jordan River waters to the arid Negev region has been capitalized on by Nasser to give him a leverage on the foreign policy and military actions of the other Arab states. In January, 1964, Nasser called an Arab chiefs-of-state meeting in Cairo where he sold his idea of a united command for the Arab armed forces that would coordinate a common strategy against Israel. Under this command, the Arab armies would be strengthened in arms and equipment, which would be paid for by the command as a whole, with the richer states—Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—providing a major contribution. Accompanying this military plan was a scheme in which Arab states possessing Jordan River tributaries—Lebanon, Syria and Jordan—would carry out diversion projects within their borders. Thus, Nasser turned Arab fears of an Israeli challenge into a foreign policy asset. For a time it looked as if the explosive Jordan waters problem would be defused by the move; however, the

plan has progressed further than similar joint Arab schemes in the past and it may reach threatening proportions in the next year or so. Nasser has climbed out on a limb on this issue, since if the Arabs fail to stop Israel's additional utilization of Jordan waters Nasser will be the target of Arab criticism.

Another vehicle for his goal of Arab unity under a socialist system is the Arab Socialist Union. Founded by Nasser in Egypt as a mass movement to bring about limited popular participation in the regime, the Arab Socialist Union is now being formed—in some cases clandestinely—under Egyptian patronage in the other Arab countries as a counter to the radical Syrian-based Baath, Nasser's bitterest Arab political foe, which has numerous branches throughout the Arab world. Nasser apparently envisages the Socialist Union as a means of amalgamating all leftist political elements, except the Communists, into a movement that will bring Arab socialism to power. So far it appears to have made little progress.

NASSER AND THE SOVIET BLOC

Egypt's relations with the Soviet bloc are the vital ingredient in its world position and its arms and economic development programs. Nasser's ability to play off the Bloc and the West against each other has been the basis of Egyptian foreign policy for nearly a decade. Bloc weapons broke the Western arms monopoly in the Middle East and Soviet economic backing for the Aswan Dam brought the Soviet Union actively onto the Middle Eastern scene.

Nasser's foreign policy basically is one of nonalignment—despite its pro-Soviet bias—and he has used it skillfully to obtain large-scale foreign assistance. It has brought him about a billion dollars worth of Soviet arms and an equal amount of Bloc economic assistance credits, and nearly the same amount in U.S. economic help during the same period.

Since Western interests and commitments in the Middle East and Africa far exceed those of the Soviet bloc and Nasser feels that as a foremost nonaligned leader he must adopt a vigorous stance against the *status quo*,

Egyptian actions and pronouncements frequently clash with those of the West, especially the United States and Great Britain. Also, since Egyptian dominance in the area depends very largely on its Soviet-equipped military establishment and area industrial leadership, Nasser is careful to keep a close relationship with the Soviet Union. This is a comparatively easy task, since the objectives of the two nations in the area largely coincide, at least in the short run. Both desire to change the *status quo* and oust Western influence and the capitalistic system. In the end, however, their basic interests are likely to clash. Both want to dominate this region and both want to impose their socio-economic systems.

Meanwhile, their close relationship has been accompanied by a number of Egyptian policies which have brought differences with the United States. One of the most recent examples is Nasser's policy in the Congo. Others have been Egyptian criticism of American policies in various parts of the world—Vietnam, Africa, Cyprus, the perennial case of Israel, and propaganda attacks against United States base rights in Libya. Other Egyptian actions have affected the interests of American allies, particularly those of Great Britain in South Arabia. The Yemen war has threatened to spill over into Saudi Arabia where there are large American oil interests and where the United States has enjoyed friendly relations for over 30 years.

Egyptian pressure on Arab governments friendly to the United States makes more difficult the carrying out of American policies in the area and naturally gives comfort to the Communist bloc. The latest example of this phenomenon is the case of Jordan, where the Egyptian-dominated United Arab Command has pressured King Hussein to participate in Arab maneuvers to deny water to Israel. This carries with it the threat of a possible clash with Israel. In turn, this has resulted in Israel asking the United States for arms to keep the Middle East arms balance even. Thus, the United States may be more involved in the Middle East arms race.

The 1965 crisis between Egypt and West

Germany is another example of Nasser's ability to unbalance the non-Communist world's position in the Middle East. Rooted in the East-West conflict, West Germany's troubles with Egypt arose over Egypt's relationship with the Soviet Union's puppet East Germany. The issue was expanded into a confrontation between the West and Nasser. Faced with a challenge by Bonn, Nasser immediately invoked the issue of Israel to rally Arab opinion against West Germany. The result has been a victory for the Soviet bloc and a further deterioration of the West's position in the Arab world.

Despite the affinity of many Soviet and Egyptian interests and Nasser's radical socio-economic policies, he has reiterated a number of times that communism is not suited to the Arabs and has stressed the importance of Islam and Arab nationalism.

By and large, evidence of Soviet pressure on Nasser in return for its largesse appears meager. Rather, Nasser from time to time has made gestures, at small cost to himself, which he thinks are pleasing to the Russians. Examples of this are the release of several hundred imprisoned Egyptian Communists, the recognition of several Communist satellite states in the Far East and, possibly, the visit in February, 1965, of East German President Walter Ulbricht. It is doubtful that Nasser envisaged the ensuing uproar with West Germany.

Another factor influencing Nasser's actions, especially in the realm of foreign relations, is his fellow Arab leader Ben Bella of Algeria, whose ideas are to the left of Nasser. In the context of Arab power politics leadership to a considerable extent depends on strident anti-Westernism and radical social philoso-

(Continued on page 308)

Gordon H. Torrey, author of *Syrian Politics and The Military, 1945–1958* (Ohio State University Press, 1964), lived in Syria and Lebanon and has traveled widely in the Middle East. He has written articles on the Syrian military, the Arab Socialist Resurrection party (Baath), and Arab socialism.

As this historian points out, "The Turkish people have been in a state of political turmoil, uncertainty and instability at least since May, 1960. . . ." Noting that the Turkish people have carried out "one of the great revolutions of our time," he sees "a growing demand for political stability, even if it appears that there is no consensus as to appropriate solutions of political problems."

Changes in Turkey

By HARRY N. HOWARD

*Professor of Middle East Studies, The School of International Service,
The American University, Washington, D. C.*

WITH THE FORMATION of a new government in 1965, Turkey would appear to have some chance to move toward long-term political stability and in the direction of sound economic development. Whatever the new slogans, it appears unlikely that the new government, under the "neutral" leadership of Suat Hayri Urguplu, will pursue a course basically different from that of its predecessor, whether in domestic or in foreign policy. Although the former minister, Ismet İnönü, predicted that the new government would soon fall apart and the members thereof would "prick their own balloons," there were some signs of political maturity, and little indication in the early spring of 1965 that the new government would risk a military coup prior to the scheduled elections in October. As in other Middle Eastern countries, there seemed every realization that the army represented the ultimate power.

Complex issues brought on the downfall of the distinguished Turkish soldier and statesman and forced İnönü's resignation from office. There were some marked differences between the Republican People's party (R.P.P.) and the Justice party (J.P.), the major opposition party. Suleyman Demirel, the 41-year old leader of the Justice party, was determined to overthrow the government and, as early as November 23, 1964, President

Cemal Gürsel and Prime Minister İnönü met the cabinet and parliamentary leaders to consider complaints by the army chief of staff that Justice party leaders might precipitate "an armed revolution."

A new star in the Turkish political firmament, Demirel is an engineer and a millionaire, who was elevated to the leadership of the Justice party in December, 1964, following the death of General Ragip Gümüşpala. Demirel gave two essential reasons for forcing the resignation of Prime Minister İnönü eight months before the scheduled elections in October. In the first place, he wanted to prove to the Turkish public that he could come to power without interference from the Turkish army, which had barred the former Democratic party (of which the Justice party was the successor) from participating in public life. Secondly, Demirel did not trust the Republican party to run a fair election in the fall of 1965, and he desired to eliminate it from any posts from which it might unduly influence the outcome.

These matters aside, however, the young Turkish political leader based his opposition to Prime Minister İnönü and the Republican party on economic grounds. One reason for opposition to the 1965 budget, it was explained, was that it did not insure sufficient economic growth. Demirel considered the most important task of the Justice party to be

the reorientation of the Turkish economy toward support of the emerging commercial classes. In some contrast, the Republican party and Prime Minister İnönü more nearly represented the principle of "étatism," or the system of state economic enterprise which had developed, and very naturally, since the foundation of the Republic in the early 1920's. In any event, the Government was held responsible for an alleged lag in the growth of the national product, unemployment and other problems.

On February 13, 1965, the government of Prime Minister İsmet İnönü was forced to resign when the Grand National Assembly, by a vote of 225 to 195, rejected his record 1965 budget of \$1.6 billion. Although this was the third coalition government which the former president (1938–1950) had headed since December 25, 1963, he had actually been in office since November 20, 1961, when President General Cemal Gürsel and the Committee of National Union had agreed to end military rule.

THE URGUPLU GOVERNMENT

On February 16, a political neutral, Suat Hayri Urguplu, not Demirel, became the new prime minister of Turkey. The new head of the Turkish government was born in 1903, and was educated at the Galatasaray and in the Faculty of Law of the University of Istanbul. He has had a varied career as a lawyer and as a diplomat, and has served in the Grand National Assembly at various periods. He served as minister of monopolies during 1943–1946. From 1961 to 1963, he was president of the Turkish senate; in 1963, he headed a parliamentary mission to the Soviet Union. As a diplomat, Urguplu has served in Bonn (1952–1955), London (1955–1957), Washington (1957) and Madrid (1957–1960), resigning the latter post following the overthrow of the Menderes government on May 27, 1960.

The new prime minister began forming his government immediately, and it was indicated that out of 22 cabinet posts, 10 would be allocated to the Justice party, including that of deputy prime minister, which went to Suley-

mán Demirel. The New Turkey, Republican Peasants and National parties each were allocated four cabinet portfolios. It was perhaps not without some significance that the Turkish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Hasan Isik, was designated to serve as foreign minister, replacing Feridun Erkin in that post. It was understood that members of the new government coalition had agreed on adherence to the principles of the revolution of May 27, 1960, the constitution of 1961, the principles of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic, land reform, and a generally moderate course, without extreme right or left influence.

The new government received a vote of confidence, 231 to 200, in the Grand National Assembly on March 4, with the Republican party, joined by 10 of 20 Independent deputies, voting solidly against the government program. Among other things, in the field of domestic policy, the program called for greater encouragement of free enterprise; similarly, in the field of foreign policy, it called for a continuation of good relations with the West within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO (of which Turkey had been a member, of its own volition, since February, 1952), the Central Treaty Organization, CENTO (1955), and other agreements. It also called for the maintenance of friendly relations with the U.S.S.R., and the development of a spirit of cooperation with the Balkan countries. It may be noted that, on March 9, Foreign Minister Isik told a press conference that Turkey could apply outside Western Europe for assistance and that the Soviet Union might be one of the donor countries.

BASIC CHANGES

The Turkish people have been in a state of political turmoil, uncertainty and instability at least since May, 1960, when the *coup d'état* of May 27, clearly signaled the vast unrest that seethed beneath the surface of the authoritarian Menderes régime. Under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk, the Turkish people had carried out one of the great revolutions of our time. It may well be, as Professor Kemal Karpat has recently suggested,

that the current unrest has been caused by the breakdown of narrow traditional forms of organization and values, on the one hand and, on the other, the pressing need to reorganize society and its economy into "modern, broader social and political units suitable to the requirements of a nation-state."¹

From the very foundations of the Republic, but almost especially during the past 15 years or so, basic changes have been taking place in Turkish society—changes to which the government, the military, and the political parties must adapt.² Parliamentary democracy, as practiced in Turkey, has been discredited among intellectuals and other groups, and there has been a growing demand for political stability, even if it appears that there is no consensus as to appropriate solutions of political problems. It is, perhaps, noteworthy that the Turkish army did not intervene during the recent political crisis of February, 1965, possibly because of lessons learned during 1962 and 1963. It would now appear doubtful that the army will intervene unless the democratic political process itself is placed in danger.

The new political situation after 1960 reflected something of the changing socio-economic situation. On the one hand, the Republican People's party, which leaned heavily on the old éstatist doctrines, shifted somewhat toward the left after 1960, under the influence of a social-minded bureaucratic group. The Justice party, heir to the outlawed Democratic party, which came into being in 1961, was dominated by new economic groups, and looked toward a more liberal economic policy, a fact which somewhat tempered its traditionalist, conservative and essentially anti-

¹ Kemal H. Karpat, "Society, Economics and Politics in Contemporary Turkey," *World Politics*, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (October, 1964), pp. 50-74.

² See especially Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1963); Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1964), Chs. IV-V; Walter F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics* (Washington: Brookings, 1963).

³ See especially Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor, *Labor Law and Practice in Turkey*. B.L.S. Report No. 239 (Washington: U. S. G. P. O., 1963).

intellectual outlook on social and economic problems. While the Democratic party had had no fundamental ideological principles or outlook, there is little doubt that its liberal economic policies did result in the intensification of economic activity and a stimulation of private, as distinguished from public or state, enterprise and the creation of new jobs in newer industries.

By 1965, it was noteworthy that the Turkish population totaled some 30 million, substantially doubling since 1939, and, more important, that the urban population had increased from 18 to more than 31 per cent within a single decade. This movement toward the city and city life is discernible in other parts of the Middle East as well. A new middle class, a majority of whom are no longer members of the intelligentsia, military or bureaucratic groups, but tradesmen, business and professional men and women, has come into being. Moreover, there is now a growing labor force,³ with almost 13 million people involved, 75 per cent in agriculture, 9.6 per cent in industry, and about 12 per cent in various services. There are some 400,000 members of labor unions, although these are neither strong nor independent in the Western sense, and about 400,000 join the labor force annually.

A BRIGHT FUTURE

If Turkey maintains a degree of political stability, and moves toward the basic development of its economic possibilities, the country and its people would appear to have a bright future. There is a sound agricultural base and important industrial and mineral and industrial resources. Turkey is the world's second producer of chrome, and it has a growing petroleum industry, with the production of crude oil in 1964 doubling that of 1963 (700,000 tons), and an expected production of some 1,500,000 tons in 1965. Zonguldak coal, Ergani copper, Keçiborlu sulphur, Balya lead, and Eskişehir meerschaum are all well developed enterprises. The new Fregli Iron and Steel Mill, Turkey's largest private enterprise, is expected to play a significant role in boosting the Turkish econ-

omy. It began limited operation in 1964 and will produce 1,000,000 tons of steel annually by 1968. The annual gross national product is now in the neighborhood of \$7 billion.

A forward-looking five year plan was inaugurated on March 1, 1963. Unlike the first such plan in Turkey, that of 1934, which concentrated almost exclusively on state development of industry, the current plan embodied a \$1.2 billion investment in agriculture, and it was hoped that there would be a 33 per cent increase in agricultural production within the five-year period. Under the plan, the government was also to invest some \$1.1 billion in manufacturing, a 57 per cent increase in industrial output being the goal for the five-year period. A total of some \$6.6 billion is to be invested during the five years; \$4 billion in the public and \$2 billion in the private sector of the economy. The plan, which is part of a 15-year comprehensive economic development program, calls for an annual growth rate of 7 per cent, which will require an investment of 18 per cent of the national income, 14 per cent from domestic and 4 per cent from increased foreign participation, or some \$350 million annually from abroad.

A PROBLEM

The latter raises something of a problem, when one realizes that United States assistance to Turkey has remained at some \$200 million per year and notes that of the \$3 billion of foreign assistance to Turkey since 1948, primarily from the United States, some two-thirds has been in the form of military, not economic assistance.⁴ For the third year of the plan, during 1965, gross national product is expected to increase by 7 per cent, as scheduled, with per capita income going up some 4 per cent to \$245. The plan calls for an outlay of \$855.6 million for public investment, including government-owned factories, and for an investment of \$555.6 million in the



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TURKEY AND HER NEIGHBORS

private sector, the largest percentages of investment being in housing (20 per cent), manufacturing (18 per cent), agriculture (18 per cent), communications (14 per cent) and power (9 per cent). Total imports under the plan for 1965 will reach \$665 million, with exports rising 10 per cent to \$410 million, leaving a deficit of \$255 million. More significant, no doubt, is the fact that the overall balance of payments deficit, including debt payments, will reach \$394 million. Turkey's need for stringent import controls is highlighted by the fact that currently some 40 per cent of Turkey's export earnings must go to debt service, not for the importation of badly needed capital goods for economic development.⁵

Significant changes were also occurring in the field of education and, indeed, in the five year plan provision was made for considerable expansion, both of general education and of technical training and university education. The proportion of literacy by 1963 was estimated at some 40 per cent, and there were said to be some 3.5 million primary school pupils, and about 380 thousand students in secondary schools. There were 452 professional and technical schools, however, with 130 thousand students. By 1963, there were 10 educational institutions for the training of high school teachers, and a number of new universities had come into being, including the Middle East Technical University at

⁴ In general see *Review of the State Planning Organization, No. 1. Planning in Turkey: Summary of The First Five Year Plan* (Ankara, 1963).

⁵ Arthur C. Lillig, "Turks Plan to Buy More," *International Commerce*, Vol. 71, No. 1 (February 1, 1965), 13-14.

Ankara, the Atatürk University at Erzurum, and the Black Sea Technical University at Trabzon.⁶

TURKEY'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

Although without political commitment, Turkey had been oriented toward the West since the earlier days of the Republic, and this was particularly true following the signature of the Montreux Convention of the Straits on July 20, 1936. Following the end of the Second World War, Turkey was under continued Soviet threat, because of the Turkish Straits and the territory in eastern Anatolia, with the result that it was forced to keep very large forces under arms, more than the Turkish economy was able to afford. On March 12, 1947, when Greece, Turkey and Iran were clearly threatened by the Soviet Union, and Soviet policy looked toward domination of the Eastern Mediterranean, United States President Harry S. Truman extended assistance to both Greece and Turkey. On February 15, 1952, both Greece and Turkey became members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and in 1955, Turkey, along with Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and the United Kingdom, became a member of the Baghdad Pact later known as the Central Treaty Organization. On March 5, 1959, Turkey signed a mutual assistance agreement with the United States. On December 1, 1964, Turkey became associated with the European Economic Community. Turkish ties with the West in general, and with the United States in particular, have endured through the years, and Turkey has remained a member of the Western alliances, despite a softening of the Soviet position and attitude toward Turkey, particularly since 1953.

Nevertheless, serious strains have developed in the Turkish relationship with the West and with the United States, especially in connection with the Cyprus question. Since the independent Republic of Cyprus was established, the Greek-speaking majority has favored union with Greece, which the

Turkish minority opposed. As the Cyprus crisis developed, especially after December, 1963, there was a strong Turkish resentment against United States policy, which was accused of not giving Turkey proper support, a charge which was echoed in Greece, from precisely the opposite point of view. Indeed, there was much criticism of the United States, not merely among so-called "leftist" groups, but among Turkish nationalists and conservatives. There were signs that ties with the West were definitely weakening and that the Turkish government might reorient its policy toward the East. During October-November, 1964, Foreign Minister Erkin visited Moscow, after which it was declared (November 6) that trade would be increased and that the U.S.S.R. would support the Turkish position relative to Cyprus. Early in March, 1965, the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey, Nikita Rijov, advised the new Turkish government that the Soviet Union was prepared to offer Turkey assistance; at the same time, work began on a joint irrigation project on the Turco-Soviet boundary in Eastern Anatolia. Moreover, the new foreign minister, Hasan Isik, declared on March 9 that Turkey could apply to countries outside Western Europe for assistance, "and the Soviet Union could be one of these." Meanwhile, a Turkish delegation left for the United States to seek assistance in the financing of a large hydro-electric project in Eastern Turkey, the total cost of which was estimated to be in the neighborhood of \$400 million.

Sentiments of the moment are one thing, national interests are often another. Turkish diplomats, whether of the old Ottoman or the modern Turkish nationalist variety, have been noted for cool and deliberate realism. Thus it may be doubted that abrupt changes in Turkish foreign policy will come in the immediate future.

Harry N. Howard served as a specialist on the Middle East in the Department of State for many years. He had lived for a time in Beirut and has traveled widely in the Middle Eastern area.

⁶ Adnan Otüken, "General Education and Learning in Turkey," *Cultura Turcica*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1964), 126-135.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

U. N. Extension of Cyprus Peace Force

On December 18, 1964, the Security Council unanimously agreed to extend the mandate of the United Nations Peace-Keeper Force in Cyprus until March 26, 1965. The complete text of the approved resolution follows:

The Security Council,

*Noting that the report by the Secretary-General (S/6102) recommends the maintenance in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeper Force created by the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 (S/5575) [for complete text of this resolution, see *Current History*, May, 1964, p. 305] for an additional period of three months,*

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has indicated its desire that the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus should be continued beyond 26 December 1964,

Noting with satisfaction that the report of the Secretary-General (S/6102) indicates that the situation in Cyprus has improved and that significant progress has been made,

Renewing the expression of its deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts in the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of 4 March 1964, 13 March 1964, 20 June 1964 and 25 September 1964,

Renewing the expression of its deep apprecia-

tion to the States that have contributed troops, police, supplies and financial support for the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions of 4 March 1964, 13 March 1964, 20 June 1964, 9 August 1964 and 25 September 1964, and the consensus expressed by the President at its 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964;

2. Calls upon all Member States to comply with the above-mentioned resolutions;

3. Takes note of the Report by the Secretary-General (S/6102);

4. Extends the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeper Force established under the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 for an additional period of three months, ending 26 March 1965.

[A subsequent resolution extending the U.N. Peace-Keeper Force in Cyprus until June 26, 1965, was unanimously passed by the Security Council on March 19, 1965.]

The U.N. on the Syrian-Israeli Dispute

On December 21, 1964, the Soviet Union vetoed a Security Council draft resolution prepared by the United States and the United Kingdom on the Syrian-Israeli border dispute. The text of this resolution follows:

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic,

Taking into consideration the report of the Secretary-General of 24 November 1964.

1. Deplores the renewal of military action on the Israel-Syria Armistice Demarcation Line on

13 November 1964 and deeply regrets the loss of life on both sides;

2. Takes note in the report of the Secretary-General of the observations of the Chief of Staff in paragraphs 24 through 27, and in the light of these observations, recommends:

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BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE MIDDLE EAST

THE VIEW FROM STEAMER POINT.

BY CHARLES JOHNSON. (New York: Praeger, 1964. 224 pages, \$5.95.)

The highly personal role of the Governor and subsequent High Commissioner of Aden, Sir Charles Johnston, in the recent history of Aden, is narrated with considerable detail in *The View From Steamer Point*. The major political changes of the last 20 years in the Middle East are dealt with only tangentially. The merit of this volume lies in its leisurely ramble through the thicket of British colonial administration. This approach is most likely to appeal to the arm-chair explorer of fading empires.

Rene Peritz
Indiana State College

POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IN JAPAN AND TURKEY. EDITED BY ROBERT E. WARD AND DANKWART A. RUSTOW. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 502 pages, \$8.75.)

Seventeen specialists on Japan and Turkey discuss the process of "political modernization" in the two Asian countries, attempting to explore the common and different factors in the two experiences. The first four essays discuss the "given" factors in modernization, i.e., the nature of traditional societies and the environmental and foreign factors. The rest treat the "variables" and the various crises and problems encountered. These include the relationship between economic and political aspects of modernization, education, mass media, the civil bureaucracies, the military establishments, political parties and leadership. Two essays, one on Japan and the other on Turkey, are devoted to each topic. The parallel essays are not always uniform in outlook, style, or organization. The

editors arrive at broad generalizations in the concluding chapter by comparing and contrasting the experiences of the two nations.

Although the book is remarkably free of jargon, it assumes considerable knowledge of the history of respective countries on the part of the reader. A valuable contribution to the growing literature on "modernization" and "political development."

Chong-Sik Lee
University of Pennsylvania

NATIONALISM IN IRAN. BY RICHARD W. COTTAM. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964. 332 pages, map and index, \$6.00.)

Politics in Twentieth Century Iran might have been an apter title for this book. Though nationalism provides the running thread of Cottam's story, reference to it to explain some attitudes and events he describes seems at times unnecessary, and at other times justified only by equating nationalism with modernization and strong central government. Yet modernizing and centralizing statesmen are not all necessarily nationalists.

Nevertheless, if one emphasis had to be chosen, the author's choice seems fair. One way or another, the nationalist issue has dominated all others in contemporary Iran. For half a century, economic and social problems were generally tackled and all too often botched in terms of nationalistic ideology. For a proud but backward country, semi-colonial in its diplomatic as in its economic position, this was inevitable. The importance of the vast illiterate peasantry, of powerful obscurantist religious leaders, of a stultifying and selfish landlord class, of interfering foreigners—as necessary as they are resented—all these are well delineated and suggest comparisons with similar groups in Latin American or southeast European nations. A work

of this nature provides comparative material for students of nationalist phenomena, useful information for students of Iran and Western Asia, and last but not least proof that comparative studies of political developments in these societies are both necessary and increasingly possible.

The stress on current affairs and the failure to ask certain relevant questions limit Cottam's scope. One would like to find more sociological information, more discussion of technological changes and their psycho-sociological effects, more attention to religious attitudes and changes in these attitudes. There are many references to the press, but none to the all-pervasive influence of radio. Similarly, reference to the *mul'ahs*, the religious leaders, makes one wonder whose sons they are and what their sons become. Nevertheless, as it stands, this careful, honest and knowledgeable analysis deserves serious consideration. It is probably too much to hope that it will affect a diplomacy which has long faced complex political situations with interpretations and solutions culled from soap opera. But it is a good try.

Eugen Weber
University of California, Los Angeles

THE UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST. EDITED BY GEORGIANA G. STEVENS. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964. 184 pages, \$3.95.)

This collection of six essays is the outgrowth of the twenty-fourth American Assembly which dealt with United States policy and the problems of the Middle East. Designed for the non-specialist, the essays illumine the sources of tension in the Middle East, particularly those arising out of the quest for modernization, the international political significance of the area, the festering Arab-Israeli discord, and the outlines of a United States policy for the region. The material is well-organized and ably analyzed and should provide a welcome supplement for discussions of American policy and Middle Eastern affairs.

A.Z.R.

IRAQ UNDER GENERAL NURI: MY RECOLLECTIONS OF NURI AL-SAID, 1954-1958. BY WALDEMAR J. GALLMAN. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. 241 pages, index, \$5.95.)

In July, 1958, a military coup overthrew the pro-Western regime of King Faisal and Prime Minister Nuri Al-Said, both of whom were killed by revolutionaries. Waldemar J. Gallman, United States Ambassador to Iraq from 1954 to 1958, has written a political portrait of Nuri which will be welcomed by historians of the period and by those who seek to evaluate the complex currents of Middle Eastern politics. Gallman believes that Nuri, whatever may have been his weaknesses, was an outstanding statesman, patriot and nationalist, dedicated to the welfare and security of Iraq.

A.Z.R.

THE MIDDLE EAST. BY STEPHEN H. LONGRIGG. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1964. 291 pages, appendices and index, \$6.95.)

This book is a useful introduction to the geography, economy, customs and peoples of the Middle East. With sympathy and clarity, the author offers a series of informative chapters on the history of the area, the evolution of social and political institutions, and the myriad of problems which currently beset the region. The beginning student will find much of value in this volume.

A.Z.R.

THE YEMEN: IMAMS, RULERS AND REVOLUTIONS. BY HAROLD INGRAMS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. 164 pages, glossary and index, \$5.00.)

A bitter and little-publicized war has been waged, since the fall of 1962, in Yemen. The civil war in that country affects developments in neighboring, British-oriented, Aden Protectorate. Involved in the civil war in Yemen and in the border fighting between Yemen and Aden are the rival aspirations of Great Britain, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The author, a veteran of years of service for the British government in that secluded area of the world, traces the history of Yemen since the time of Mohammed, the spread of Arab rule, and the intrusion of Western influence in the eighteenth century through the decline of the Ottoman empire and the ascendancy of British rule. He provides a valuable, lucid account of the background of the current conflict. A.Z.R.

EASTERN ARABIAN FRONTIERS. By J. B. KELLY. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. 319 pages, appendix and index, \$8.50.)

For several decades, "the delimitation of the eastern frontier of Saudi Arabia with her neighbors, Qatar, the Trucial Sheikdoms, and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, has been a major issue in the politics of the Arabian peninsula." This carefully researched study places the issue in historical perspective and focusses on the dynamics of the persisting inability of Saudi Arabia and Great Britain to reach a satisfactory settlement. Though "the frontier issue has been variously portrayed as a struggle between rival oil companies, American in Saudi Arabia, British in the littoral states, as the striving of Saudi Arabia to fulfill her 'manifest destiny' to rule Arabia from sea to sea, and, of course, as the last flicker of a fading imperialism before the inexorable spread of Arab nationalism," the author argues that at least as important a principle is at stake: namely, the continued existence of small states confronted by more powerful neighbors with territorial ambitions.

A.Z.R.

MISCELLANY

THE SOVIETS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: CHANGING POLICY TOWARD DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964. 367 pages and index, \$7.50.)

The author deserves full praise for his painstaking analysis of a number of case

studies illustrating Soviet behavior in certain United Nations agencies. The research is solid; it is based on a thorough investigation of available source material and on personal interviews of United Nations personnel. Otherwise, the description of the Soviet image of the United Nations is standard, while the discussion of the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy offers no new interpretations.

This book is essentially a collection of essays and case studies dealing with a number of more or less related topics. Both the United Nations and the Soviet Union appear prominently in each of them and this apparently led the author to bring them together under a title which does not truly reflect the content of the book. (One should add that this use of the word "Soviets" in a book published by a well-known university press comes as a surprise.)

Andrzej Korbonski
University of California, Los Angeles

INDIAN NATIONALISM AND HINDU SOCIAL REFORM. By CHARLES H HEIMSATH. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 356 pages, bibliography and index, \$8.50.)

In this careful and extremely well written study Professor Heimsath traces in detail the development of the social reform movement in India from the early nineteenth century to World War I, with a brief treatment of the major developments up to the present. He is chiefly concerned with the varied and shifting relationships between Hindu social reform and modern Indian nationalism. While much of the previous writing on this subject has focused on the figures of Gokhale and Tilak, both from Maharashtra, Professor Heimsath has made a significant contribution by emphasizing the regional variations in Northern India, Madras and Bengal as well as in Bombay.

Donald E. Smitl
University of Pennsylvania

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THE CYPRUS DISPUTE

(Continued from page 276)

February arrived in Nicosia with the support of the British, Greek and Turkish governments to secure Makarios' agreement to a 10,000-man NATO peace force. Unfortunately, the Greek Cypriots did not trust a NATO which relied so heavily on Turkey for its defense arrangements in the eastern Mediterranean; Makarios felt that a more favorable political solution would be found in the United Nations with the support of Communist and Afro-Asian votes.

With the collapse of Ball's mission, the scene shifted to New York. On February 15, one hour before the Cypriot ambassador was to make his appeal to the United Nations, Britain asked for an early meeting of the Security Council to deal with the "dangerous situation" in Cyprus.

On March 4, the Security Council unanimously recommended the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force and the appointment of a mediator "for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, bearing in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security." The Force was to be stationed in Cyprus for three months, and all costs were to be met by the states providing contingents and by the government of Cyprus and by voluntary contributions.⁶

On March 13, after another Greek Cypriot complaint of Turkish preparations to invade Cyprus, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon all members to comply with its resolution of March 4 and to refrain from any action which might worsen the situation. The Security Council subsequently extended the term of the peace-keeping force. (See document, page 301 of this issue.)

The most dangerous point in the Cyprus dispute came in early August, 1964. As Greek Cypriots pressed their attacks on Turkish Cypriot positions in northwest Cyprus, jet planes from Turkey retaliated by strafing Greek Cypriot forces.

The Turkish government maintained that the air strikes were provoked by Greek Cypriot attacks, and that the Greek Cypriot military buildup on Cyprus was the real cause of tension. The Greek Cypriots maintained that a military buildup was necessary to counter the real possibility of a Turkish invasion. The representative of Greece declared that unless the Turkish attacks ended immediately, Greece would assist Cyprus "by all the military means available to it."⁷ On August 11, the Security Council adopted a resolution sponsored by Britain and the United States calling for an immediate ceasefire and for full cooperation of all concerned in the restoration of peace.

INDEPENDENCE, PARTITION, OR ENOSIS

All parties agree that the present constitutional framework is no longer viable. Greece and the Greek Cypriots, with the exception of the Greek Cypriot Communists, favor the right of self-determination for a unified Cyprus, which is another way of saying that they favor the union of the island with Greece. Nonetheless, they are apparently willing to give up the idea of *Enosis* and would be content with the existence of two Hellenic states—Greece and Cyprus.

Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots favor partition, with the right of self-determination for each community. They are willing, however, to support the idea of a federal state provided that the Turkish Cypriots are moved into cantons of their own.

Britain, it appears, would favor a solution agreeable to Greece and Turkey which would allow her to maintain her bases on the island. However, Britain would probably not insist on holding her bases if relinquishing her sovereignty over them would lead to a permanent Greek-Turkish settlement. Britain and the United States would go along with almost any plan agreeable to Greece and Turkey.

⁶ United Nations Doc. S/5575.

⁷ United Nations Doc. S/PV. 1143, 9 August, 1964, p. 12; United Nations Doc. S/PV. 1143, 11 August, 1964, p. 212.

The main concern of the United States is to prevent war between her two NATO allies. To this end we have on several occasions held the Turks back from invading Cyprus and have pressured the Greek government to exert its influence on Makarios. We recognize the Zurich and London agreements as valid but agree that they should be renegotiated.

The United States has suggested a compromise solution (the Acheson Plan), based on *Enosis* and compensation to Turkey. Under the plan, a military base on Cyprus would be ceded to Turkey along with one of the smaller Greek islands, and the Turkish community would be given two cantons under its own administration. But the Greek Cypriots have rejected this plan, as well as any other solution that would call for the mass exchange of Greeks and Turks on Cyprus and allow for a Turkish military presence on the island.⁸

The Soviet Union began by favoring the right of self-determination for a unified Cyprus but since December, 1964, has changed her position in favor of an independent Federal Republic of Cyprus. Russia is, in fact, determined to play it both ways with the Greeks and Turks. But in the last resort the Russians are bound to support the side that opposes *Enosis*. The union of the island with Greece or even a portion of the island with Greece would drive AKEL, or the Communist party of Cyprus, underground. The Communist party is outlawed in Greece and in Turkey.

The Arabs favor a Greek Cyprus with the elimination of the British bases and the absence of NATO bases on the island. These bases, the Arabs fear, would be used by the West in the event of an Arab-Israeli war or as a means to intimidate the Arab world. They have not forgotten the Suez invasion of 1956 which was launched from Cyprus.

In spite of all his efforts, the United Nations mediator, Galo Plaza, on his way through London on March 2, 1964, said that an "agreed solution" was impossible at the

moment.⁹ The opposing sides will have to consider discussing ideas they have automatically rejected in the past if Cyprus is to return to a state of peace and security. A new and critical phase of the Cyprus question is probably about to begin.

DILEMMA IN IRAN

(Continued from page 280)

had existed in Turkey, under Mustafa Kemal, and in Egypt, under Gamal Abdel Nasser; but neither of these leaders was an aristocrat. In each case, the "reformer" had come from the middle class and had gained unconditional middle-class support from the beginning of his reforms. But in Iran the middle class, which supplies the country's rank and file politicians and most stable political element, and which is traditionally conservative, has shown itself suspicious of the Shah's programs. The "élite" form the Shah's major political base in Iran. But their support is volatile and none expects it to be indefinite. They will support the Shah as long as he adopts their ideas, however shallow they may be, as was obvious in the last general elections. To most of them, Iran is an experimental kitchen where personal frustrations can be satisfied. Finally, there is the army, the only force of which the Shah is certain. It is a tremendous force of nearly one quarter of a million men who hold Iran together.

The problems, therefore, that face the Shah of Iran have no simple answers. When former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Mansour was assassinated in January, 1965, his brother-in-law, Amir Abbas Hoveida, succeeded him. The Shah's economic programs, it was said, were not affected by that tragedy. But the basic concept of internal security was altered, tipping the balance toward more repressive measures against the opposition. Soon after the assassination, the Shah replaced the mild-mannered head of the secret police, General Hassan Pakravan, with General Nasratullah Nuseiri, better known for ruthlessness than restraint.

Events of this sort have become typical of

⁸ *The New York Times*, August 24, 1964.

⁹ *The Economist*, March 6, 1964.

Iran in recent years, symbolizing the Shah's entire approach to the crisis and characterizing its nature. When in September, 1963, general elections were held after 28 months of imperial rule by decree, the Shah closed almost every newspaper in Teheran, outlawed political rallies, and placed nearly all religious leaders and "unfriendly" politicians under house arrest, in order to give his own hand-picked candidates an overwhelming margin. The Shah is sincerely seeking public support for his programs, but should such support fail to materialize, he is determined to carry them out anyway. He is seeking to give Iran a better legislative body; toward this end, he bends every rule of democratic life. Only the end seems to interest him, whatever the means he must use.

As Americans we face a dilemma in Iran. On one hand, we cannot approve such governing practices as those already in full use by the Shah. On the other hand, we know that the only alternative in Iran today is a people's republic, which we can tolerate even less. Sooner or later, we shall have to make a choice. A settlement in Southeast Asia may allow the Red Chinese to boost their efforts in Syria and Iraq, thus affecting the situation in Iran. They are already on good terms with those two Middle Eastern countries and with Pakistan, Iran's eastern neighbor. The situation in Turkey, Iran's western neighbor, is unpredictable, especially if the new signs of deterioration in Cyprus materialize.

Another important factor is Gamal Abdel Nasser. If Iraq does not change regimes, he will become a neighbor of the Shah before too long when the planned merger between Iraq and the U.A.R. goes through. Nasserism is not confined to the Arab world; it has extended itself into many parts of Africa and is at work in Iran right now, especially in the southern regions.

It is essential for the West that Iran remain in the Western camp, and for this, the Shah must remain. He can do this only by an accommodation with the opposition. Such an accommodation would give him the time he needs to build a lasting political base.

IRAQ

(Continued from page 289)

inherited wealth.) Economically, the revolutionary turmoil definitely delayed orderly development. And, finally, in psychological terms, one may ask whether the sense of liberation from "feudalism, monopoly capitalism, and imperialism" has not been offset by the insecurity, fear, and hypocritical conformity which the modern revolutionary regimes demand of their subjects as the price of survival.

SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISPUTE

(Continued from page 301)

(a) That Israel and Syria co-operate fully with the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in his efforts to maintain peace in the area;

(b) That the parties co-operate promptly in the continuation of the work begun in 1963, of survey and demarcation as suggested in paragraph 45 of document S/5401, commencing in the area of Tel El Qadi, and proceeding thereafter to completion, in fulfilment of the recommendations of the Chief of Staff's reports of 24 August 1963 and 24 November 1964;

(c) That Israel as well as Syria participate fully in the meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council by 31 March of the progress that has been made toward implementing these suggestions.

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NASSER'S EGYPT

(Continued from page 295)

phy. Thus, in order to retain his position as the Arab spokesman, Nasser feels compelled to adopt radical positions and become involved in activities which nettle the West or are in concert with other radical leaders who retain anti-Western phobias.

NASSER AND THE BAATH

The main goals of Nasser's Arab socialism and the Syrian Baath are practically the same—socialism and Arab unity. They clash, however, over the methods of reaching their ultimate objectives. The Baath socialism is based on a party with a cellular structure and party democracy, while Nasser's Arab socialism is an essentially authoritarian leadership system. The Baath discusses and threshes out its differences within the cell and by means of almost annual party congresses, whereas under Nasser decisions are made at the top. Nasser's socialism is based on the power of the Egyptian state which is used to gain its objectives. On the other hand, the Baath depends on its branches throughout the Arab countries to carry its message and attain its goals.

Following the Iraqi and Syrian coups in 1963 in which the Baath emerged triumphant, attempts were made to bring about unity with Egypt, long a Baathist objective. These negotiations foundered over the issue of leadership of the new united Arab state. The Baathists, fearful of Nasser's domination, insisted on a tripartite leadership, whereas Nasser demanded that real leadership be based in Cairo and that the state be administered on an authoritarian basis. Since that time, the Baath has been ousted in Iraq and replaced by a pro-Nasser regime. A bitter struggle has been waged between Baathist Syria and Egypt and there seems to be little hope for a real reconciliation. While it is impossible to predict the outcome of this rivalry it is certain that socialism will remain the most dynamic political ideology in the Arab world.

BOOKS

(Continued from page 304)

CONFLICT IN LAOS: THE POLITICS OF NEUTRALIZATION. By ARTHUR J. DOMMEN. (New York: Praeger, 1964. 336 pages, \$5.95.)

Arthur J. Dommen, former Bureau Manager for the United Press International in the Far East, has written an incisive, detailed, informative and often provocative account of the tortuous politics of Laos. Tracing the major political events in that country since the abortive Geneva Conference of 1954, he has given the non-specialist reader essential data for an analysis of the contemporary patterns of events in Indochina. Chapters 9 through 13 are particularly helpful in clarifying the strange relationships and continual infighting between the supporters of the Royal Government and the forces represented by the Pathet Lao.

This volume is timely and should be considered an important addition to the scant literature focusing on nationalism in an emergent Asian state.

René Peritz
Indiana State College

A STUDY OF WAR. By QUINCY WRIGHT, abridged by Louise Leonard Wright. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. 430 pages and index, \$7.50.)

The author's wife has abridged (partly by sacrificing footnotes and bibliography) Quincy Wright's now-classic 1942 study. While she has incorporated new material from the author's more recent publications to bring the topics up to date, she has not modified the 1942 framework to reassess adequately the fear of war as a motivation for agreement in the nuclear age. While her cuts will grieve the scholar, the layman may find the abridgement preferable for his purposes.

G. W. Thumm
Bates College

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of March, 1965, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

African and Asian Islamic Conference

Mar. 13—A week-long conference at Bandung, Indonesia, ends. The 33 delegations adopt a resolution condemning imperialism. The delegates agree to establish an Africa-Asia Islamic Organization with headquarters in Indonesia.

Arab League

Mar. 15—The 13 foreign ministers from the Arab League states meet. Ten ministers vote in favor of breaking off diplomatic relations with West Germany if it sets up formal diplomatic ties with Israel. The ministers from Tunisia, Morocco and Libya express reservations about such a step.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Mar. 2—The Council of Ministers agrees to fuse the executive bodies of the E.E.C., Euratom and the Coal and Steel Community into one administrative agency. The Council of Ministers also directs the E.E.C.'s Executive Commission to open treaty negotiations with Austria, a member of the European Free Trade Association.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Mar. 18—at the Kennedy round of tariff-cutting negotiations under the auspices of GATT, formal approval is given to an agreement on the procedure and timetable for negotiations regarding agricultural products. Proposals on grains are to be presented by April 26, 1965; negotiations will begin on May 17. Poland and Czechoslovakia are permitted to participate in the Kennedy round.

Mar. 25—A 15-man committee tells the U.S. that its pact with Canada for free trade in automobiles and parts violates GATT's "most-favored-nation" rule.

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

Mar. 14—Labor leaders from Britain, West Germany and Canada confer in Brussels with U.S. A.F.L.-C.I.O. President George Meany in closed session. (See *U.S., Labor.*)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Mar. 6—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in a speech in Cleveland, Ohio, urges the NATO allies to support U.S. defense of Southeast Asia. He proposes that the Western Atlantic nations promote cooperation on economics, foreign policy and nuclear defense.

Organization of African Unity

Mar. 4—Congolese Premier Moise Tshombe arrives in Nairobi, Kenya, to appeal for support from the O.A.U. conference.

Mar. 9—The Council of Ministers adopts a resolution to put off discussion of the Congo until a heads-of-state meeting scheduled for September, 1965.

United Nations

Mar. 2—The U.S. announces that it will give \$60 million to the U.N. Special Fund and Expanded Technical Assistance Program.

Mar. 19—The Security Council agrees to maintain the U.N. peace-keeping force in Cyprus for another 3 months through June 26, 1965. (See also *British Commonwealth, Cyprus.*)

ARGENTINA

Mar. 14—Congressional elections are held for 99 of the 192 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (lower house).

Mar. 15—Nearly complete returns reveal that the Peronist Popular Union received 2.7 million votes and the People's Radicals (the government party) some 2.6 million votes. The People's Radicals will have 75 seats in the Chamber, an increase of 10; the Peronists will have 43, an increase of 26.

AUSTRIA

Mar. 5—President Adolf Schärf, who died on Feb. 28 at the age of 74, is buried.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, THE

Ceylon

Mar. 22—Elections for 151 members of the Supreme Legislature (parliament) are held.

Mar. 23—Official returns disclose that the United National party has won 66 seats. The incumbent prime minister's party, the Freedom party led by Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, has won 41 seats.

Mar. 25—Prime Minister Bandaranaike resigns. The leader of the United National party, Dudley Senanayake, is sworn in as prime minister. With the support of minor groups, he has a majority of 90 in the parliament.

Cyprus

Mar. 12—In a report to the U.N. Security Council, Secretary-General U Thant warns that the Greek Cypriote government has received new military equipment in the last 3 months. The materiel, reportedly including 30 Soviet tanks, has not been reported to the U.N. as required by a September 10, 1964, agreement. (See also *Int'l. U.N.*)

Mar. 16—Fighting erupts between Turkish and Greek Cypriotes in the village of Ambelikou.

Mar. 17—at the U.N., Secretary-General U

Thant reports on the renewed outbreak of fighting on Cyprus.

Mar. 18—*The New York Times* reports that the U.S. government has evidence that Soviet antiaircraft missiles are to be installed on Cyprus by the Cypriote government.

Mar. 19—Turkish Premier Suat Hayri Urguplu, in a message to a former Greek minister in Ankara, George Drossos, published in the Greek paper *Ethnos*, urges Greek-Turkish bilateral negotiations to settle the Cyprus question.

Mar. 30—A report by the U.N. mediator for Cyprus, Galo Plaza Lasso, calls for immediate talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriotes. He proposes that a single Cypriote government be set up with equal rights for all Cypriotes, Greek or Turkish.

Great Britain

Mar. 6—Prime Minister Harold Wilson arrives in West Berlin at the start of a 3-day visit to West Germany.

Malaysia, Federation of

Mar. 11—Malaysian and Indonesian forces battle along the Sarawak-Borneo frontier.

Nigeria

Mar. 18—New parliamentary elections are held in 54 constituencies in eastern Nigeria and the federal territory of Lagos. The Nigerian National Alliance party of Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa won 198 seats in the 312-member legislature in the general elections of December, 1964.

Pakistan

Mar. 2—President Mohammad Ayub Khan arrives in Communist China for a week's visit.

Mar. 21—Unofficial but nearly complete returns from the 80,000-member electoral college reveal that President Mohammad Ayub Khan's Muslim League has won most of the 150 seats in the unicameral legislative body.

BRITISH TERRITORIES, THE

Bechuanaland

Mar. 2—In the first parliamentary elections in this protectorate, held yesterday, it is reported that Seretse Khama's Bechuana-land Democratic party has won 23 of the 31 seats in the Legislative Assembly.

British Honduras

Mar. 1—Elections for an 18-member House of Representatives are held; it will provide internal self-government.

Mar. 3—George Price, first premier of British Honduras, is sworn in. Price's Peoples United party has won 16 of the 18 seats in the House of Representatives.

Rhodesia

Mar. 3—British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Arthur Bottomley ends a 10-day visit to Rhodesia to investigate Rhodesian attitudes toward independence.

Mar. 30—The parliament is dissolved; general elections are called for May. It is reported that the elections may be considered by Prime Minister Ian Smith as a referendum on unilateral declaration of independence for Rhodesia.

South Arabia, Federation of

Mar. 7—Abdul Qawee Mackawee is sworn in as chief minister of the state of Aden within the Federation. Mackawee opposes Aden's merger with the Federation's other 16 states.

CHILE

Mar. 7—In congressional elections today, unofficial returns disclose that President Eduardo Frei Montalva's Christian Democratic party has won 76 of the 147 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

Mar. 8—Almost complete returns give the Christian Democrats 12 senate seats and 82 chamber seats.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Mar. 1—*Hsinhua* (government press agency), in a commentary at the start of the international Communist meeting in Moscow boycotted by the Red Chinese, declares that the new Soviet leaders have only served to "intensify anti-China agitation." The new Soviet leadership is accused of continuing to sell "the old wares of Khrushchev revisionism."

Mar. 2—Pakistani President Mohammed Ayub Khan arrives in Peking.

Mar. 6—in Peking, 400 students demonstrate in front of the Soviet embassy to protest the way the Soviet Union dispersed a March 4 attack in Moscow on the U.S. embassy by 2,000 Asian students.

Mar. 7—A joint communiqué is issued by Pakistan and Communist China supporting anti-imperialist struggles.

Mar. 17—An editorial in *Jenmin Jih Pao* (official newspaper) criticizes U.S. policy in Vietnam and insists that the U.S. let the Vietnamese people settle their own problems.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Brazzaville)

Mar. 27—Former President Fulbert Youlou reportedly escapes from "house arrest."

Mar. 28—It is reported that Fulbert Youlou is in the former Belgian Congo.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Mar. 1—*The New York Times* reports that Congolese rebels are shipping out gold from northeastern Congolese mines through the Sudan and Uganda.

Mar. 17—Government troops battle rebel border forces in an attempt to cut off rebel supply lines from Uganda and the Sudan.

Mar. 18—Elections for the national and provincial assemblies, to be held over a 6-week period, open in Katanga.

FRANCE

Mar. 22—France and the Soviet Union sign

an agreement to cooperate in development of a color television system.

Mar. 29—French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville ends a 3-day visit to Italy. It is reported that Couve de Murville agrees to an Italian proposal for a Common Market foreign ministers' meeting to discuss political unity for Europe this spring, but refuses to set a date.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (EAST)

Mar. 1—The U.A.R. and East Germany sign a \$100 million economic aid agreement whereby Cairo will receive long-term and short-term industrial credits. It is reported by U.A.R. sources that the U.A.R. will open a consulate general, without full diplomatic status, in East Berlin.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Mar. 7—The West German government announces that it will seek to establish formal diplomatic relations with Israel.

Mar. 9—British Prime Minister Harold Wilson ends a 4-day visit to West Germany. A British-West German joint communiqué promises that every effort will be made to offset the costs of maintaining the British Army of the Rhine in West Germany by West German purchases in Great Britain.

Mar. 16—in Lebanon and Iraq, mobs demonstrate to protest West Germany's decision to recognize Israel.

Mar. 18—The German embassy in Cairo confirms that a West German parliamentary deputy visited Cairo secretly to discuss the recent crisis over West Germany's plan to recognize Israel. President Nasser has threatened to seize West German assets in the U.A.R. and to recognize East Germany if Bonn recognizes Israel.

Mar. 25—The Bundestag approves a bill in effect extending the statute of limitations on the prosecution of Nazi criminals from May 8, 1965, to December 31, 1969.

INDONESIA

Mar. 4—Director of the U.S. Information

Agency Carl T. Rowan announces that the U.S.I.A. is ending its activities in Indonesia. Last week Indonesia seized 5 U.S.I.A. libraries.

Mar. 18—Communist workers at a U.S.-owned oil refinery and oil field demonstrate to demand that the installations be turned over to them, according to "informed sources" reported in *The New York Times*. Communist labor unions turn off electricity and gas at a U.S. embassy apartment building and the home of the U.S. naval attaché.

Mar. 19—President Sukarno announces that Indonesia has seized control of Stanvac and Caltex, 2 U.S. oil companies, and Shell Oil, owned by the British and Dutch.

Mar. 20—it is reported that Pan American Oil, a U.S. company doing oil exploration work, has also been seized.

Mar. 22—The minister of basic industries and mining, Chairul Saleh, declares that the 4 foreign oil companies expropriated by Indonesia will continue to operate under the 1963 oil agreements, subject to government control and supervision.

Mar. 23—The Indonesian government announces the seizure of the Goodyear Tire factory at Bogor, effective yesterday. It is reported that starting yesterday, the Communist union of postal workers has refused to give mail and telegraph service to the U.S. embassy. U.S. news agencies are also denied telegraph communications.

ISRAEL

Mar. 1—U.S. Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman ends 5 days of talks with Israeli officials.

Mar. 13—*The New York Times* reports that Israel has allowed U.S. officials to inspect her Dimona atomic reactor.

Mar. 16—The Knesset (parliament) votes to set up diplomatic relations with West Germany. (See also *German Federal Republic*.)

In an exchange of fire with Syrian troops, one Israeli is killed.

Mar. 17—The Damascus radio charges tha

Israeli forces attacked a Syrian water project which diverts Jordan River waters. At the U.N., an Israeli spokesman asserts that his country was only returning Syrian gunfire.

Mar. 24—Premier Levi Eshkol arrives in Britain for a 6-day visit.

LAOS

Mar. 3—U.S. Air Force jet planes bomb the Ho Chi Minh trail in eastern Laos, which serves as a supply line for Vietcong rebels in South Vietnam.

Mar. 28—It is reported that troops loyal to General Phoumi Nosavan seized the town of Thakhek this morning. Nosavan fled to Thailand in February after an abortive attempt at a coup.

Mar. 29—The chief of staff, General Ouane Rathikone, declares that an ultimatum has been given to rebels to yield Thakhek within 24 hours.

LIBYA

Mar. 20—Premier Mahmoud Muntasser resigns. Foreign Minister Hussein Mazik is named to the premiership.

MOROCCO

Mar. 24—In Rabat and Casablanca, student rioting to protest the government's new educational policy is curbed. Army and police forces maintain order. It is reported that some 25 persons have been killed in the 2 days of rioting.

NETHERLANDS, THE

Mar. 15—Queen Juliana asks Joseph M.T.L. Cals, member of parliament and of the Roman Catholic People's party, to form a new cabinet.

RUMANIA

Mar. 19—President Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej dies.

Mar. 23—It is reported that last night Nicolae Ceausescu was chosen to succeed Gheorghiu-Dej as first secretary of the Rumanian Workers' (Communist) party. The Central Committee names Chivu Stoica to Gheorghiu-Dej's post of president of the

State Council, or titular head-of-state.

SAUDI ARABIA

Mar. 29—King Faisal appoints his brother Khaled as Crown Prince.

SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF

Mar. 15—Two cabinet ministers announce a new policy of segregated audiences for all places of public recreation, including theaters, concerts and sports events.

SPAIN

Mar. 13—About 1,000 coal miners attack police headquarters in Mieres in the Asturian coal mining district.

SUDAN, THE

Mar. 6—Premier Sir-el-Khatim el-Khalifa, at a meeting of political parties, urges southern groups to end their fighting and negotiate their problems.

SWEDEN

Mar. 7—Queen Louise dies at the age of 75.

SYRIA

Mar. 4—The Damascus radio broadcasts a decree by the Presidency Council nationalizing 9 oil companies, 6 Syrian, 2 U.S. affiliates and 1 joint British-Dutch company. The decree declares that compensation will be awarded.

TUNISIA

Mar. 11—President Habib Bourguiba, in statements in Lebanon, refuses to join in the proposed Arab boycott of the West German government; he criticizes Nasser's handling of the flare-up over West Germany's decision to recognize Israel. (See also *Intl. Arab League* and *U.A.R.*)

TURKEY

Mar. 4—The Chamber of Deputies votes approval of the program of the new 4-power coalition government under Premier Suat Hayri Urguplu. (See also *British Commonwealth, Cyprus*.)

U.S.S.R., THE

Mar. 1—at an East German reception, So-

viet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin criticizes U.S. policy in Vietnam. He declares that he sent a letter 2 months ago to President Johnson urging a meeting between them and that the U.S. has not answered.

A consultative conference of 19 Communist parties opens in Moscow.

Mar. 3—*Tass* (official press agency) reports a decree issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet placing Soviet defense industries under centralized control; they were formerly under the direction of regional councils. The "state committees" for aircraft, defense technology, radio, shipbuilding, electronics and medium industry are transformed into ministries.

Mar. 4—*Tass* publishes a statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko delivered during a meeting with U.S. Ambassador Foy D. Kohler. Gromyko warns that continued U.S. aggression in Vietnam endangers U.S.-Soviet peaceful coexistence.

Soviet troops and policemen battle with some 2,000 demonstrators, mostly Asians plus some Africans and Europeans, who attack and deface the U.S. embassy in Moscow to protest U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. (See also U.S., *Foreign Policy*.)

Mar. 5—The consultative conference, meeting in closed session in Moscow, ends.

Mar. 10—A communiqué by the nations attending the consultative conference is issued. The communiqué condemns imperialism. It declares that a world Communist conference should be summoned only after careful and detailed preparations and talks.

Mar. 12—in reply to a Communist Chinese note demanding that the Soviet government apologize to the students engaged in the attack on the U.S. embassy, the Soviet government, in a note made public by *Tass*, accuses the Chinese Communists of "slander" and of "an intolerable attack" on the Soviet Union.

Mar. 16—The chairman of the State Committee for Inventions tells the International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property that the Soviet Union will sign

the international patents agreement.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko confers in London with British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart on the first day of a 4-day visit.

Mar. 19—A Soviet spacecraft, *Voskhod 2*, with 2 Russian astronauts aboard, lands safely after 26 hours in orbit. During the flight, Lieutenant Colonel Aleksei A. Leonov, tethered by a 5-yard lifeline, left the capsule to float in space for 10 minutes. The 2 men are reported to be in good health.

Mar. 26—The Soviet Union sends a note to the U.S. embassy, in which it protests the use of "poisonous gases" by the U.S. in Vietnam. (See also *Vietnam*.)

Mar. 27—at the close of a 3-day plenary meeting, the Central Committee reorganizes the administration of the national economy. The first deputy premier in charge of the Soviet economy, Dmitri F. Ustinov, is appointed secretary of the party's 10-member national secretariat. Leonid F. Ilychev is removed from the post of party secretary; he will become a deputy foreign minister. Kirill T. Mazurov will take over Mr. Ustinov's job as first deputy premier; Vladimir N. Novikov will assume Ustinov's duties as head of the Supreme National Economic Council.

A speech by Leonid Brezhnev at the Central Committee meeting is published in which large-scale agricultural reforms are announced. More investment in agriculture, higher farm prices and other benefits are planned to improve the farmers' standard of living.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Mar. 2—East German President Walter Ulbricht ends a 7-day visit to the U.A.R.

Mar. 10—President Gamal Abdel Nasser asserts that if West Germany establishes diplomatic ties with Israel, the U.A.R. will formally recognize Communist East Germany. (See also *Germany*.)

Mar. 15—Nasser runs unopposed for another 6-year presidential term.

Mar. 18—Exiled King Farouk of Egypt dies in Rome at the age of 45.

Mar. 26—The U.A.R. offers the U.S. the Temple of Dendur in appreciation of U.S. financial assistance in saving the Nubian monuments. The Temple has been dismantled and is ready for shipment.

UNITED STATES, THE Economy

Mar. 2—Secretary of Commerce John T. Connor expresses confidence that U.S. companies will curb voluntarily the flow of U.S. dollars overseas to reduce the balance of payments gap.

Mar. 4—In his annual Manpower Report to Congress, President Lyndon B. Johnson points out the unemployment problems created by teenagers, Negroes and uneducated or unskilled laborers.

The Labor Department reports that in February the unemployment rate rose to 5 per cent.

Mar. 7—The Federal Reserve Board outlines 14 guidelines for commercial banks co-operating to reduce loans overseas.

Mar. 14—The Internal Revenue Service creates a uniform bad-debt reserves percentage level to be set aside by banks; banks must keep 2.4 per cent of outstanding loans in their bad-debt reserves.

Mar. 16—Secretary of Commerce Connor discloses the contents of a letter sent to 632 U.S. corporations with sizeable international business activities, outlining possible means of voluntarily reducing the flow of investments overseas.

Foreign Policy

Mar. 5—The U.S. State Department protests to the Soviet Union against inadequate police protection for the U.S. embassy in Moscow. Yesterday some 2,000 students attacked the embassy, defacing it and breaking over 300 windows. (See also *China* and *U.S.S.R.*)

Mar. 9—The U.S. State Department discloses that it has rejected an appeal by U.N. Secretary-General U Thant for a "preliminary" meeting with the Soviet Union,

Britain, France, Communist China, and North and South Vietnam, to discuss the Vietnamese crisis: North Vietnam must stop its aggression before negotiations can proceed. (See also *Vietnam*.)

Mar. 10—President Johnson, accompanied by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and McGeorge Bundy, special assistant for national security affairs, spends the day at Camp David, the presidential retreat. It is reported that they discussed the Vietnam situation.

Mar. 21—British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart arrives in Washington for talks with U.S. President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk.

Mar. 22—It is reported that President Johnson will send Ellsworth Bunker, a retired U.S. ambassador, to Indonesia to try to ease U.S.-Indonesian conflicts. (See also *Indonesia*.)

U.S. officials disclose that the U.S. has been using non-lethal, nauseous gases in South Vietnam. (See also *Vietnam*.)

Mar. 23—White House Press Secretary George Reedy declares that the President was not consulted on the decision to use nauseous gases in Vietnam. Speaking before the National Press Club, British Foreign Secretary Stewart condemns the use of gas. Secretary of Defense McNamara defends the use of gases and compares them with gases used by riot police.

Mar. 24—Rusk clarifies the U.S. position on the use of gases and emphasizes that the U.S. is not planning to introduce "gas warfare" in Vietnam.

Mar. 26—President Johnson appoints a 9-man advisory council under Cornell University President James A. Perkins to make a country-by-country check of U.S. foreign aid programs and to report on possible improvements in the programs.

Mar. 29—U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Maxwell Taylor begins a week of consultations in Washington. He meets with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

Government

Mar. 2—The Senate Rules Committee, investigating the affairs of Robert (Bobby) Baker, discloses that a report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation has discredited the testimony of Don G. Reynolds, an insurance salesman and a key witness against Baker.

In a special message on urban problems to Congress, President Johnson proposes a department of housing and urban development with cabinet-level rank, and special financial aid for building 500,000 new dwellings for middle income families.

Mar. 3—The House of Representatives passes, 257-165, the \$1.1 billion bill to aid economically depressed areas in 11 Appalachian states. It is sent to the President.

Mar. 4—President Johnson signs a bill repealing the 25 per cent gold support requirement for deposits in Federal Reserve banks.

President Johnson sends Congress the National Wild Rivers System bill.

President Johnson proposes legislation to Congress setting up test projects to improve passenger rail transportation.

Buford Ellington is sworn in as Director of Emergency Planning.

Mar. 8—President Johnson, in a special message to Congress, outlines a program to combat lawlessness. Legislation to increase the federal government's power to fight crime is being drafted for congressional action.

Mar. 9—President Johnson signs the \$1.1 billion Appalachia bill.

The U.S. government sells \$341 million of common stock in the General Aniline and Film Corporation (confiscated as enemy property during World War II).

Mar. 10—President Johnson asks Congress to authorize \$10 million in grants and loans for the support of artistic and humanistic studies; a National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities would be set up.

Mar. 13—After a 3-hour interview with Alabama Governor George C. Wallace, President Johnson tells a news conference

that the brutality in Selma "was an American tragedy." (See also *Segregation*.)

Mar. 15—Before a joint session of Congress, President Johnson delivers a televised address urging immediate passage of a bill to outlaw discrimination in voter registration. Johnson proclaims that the U.S. "must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice" and that "we shall overcome."

Mar. 17—A bill to protect the citizens' right to vote and to register to vote is submitted to Congress by President Johnson. The bill authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to appoint federal registration examiners in any of the states, or any political subdivision of a state, where voter qualification tests are now used and where less than 50 per cent of eligible adults voted in the 1964 election. This will affect Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina and Virginia, and certain "political subdivisions" in other states.

Mar. 18—President Johnson names Henry H. Fowler Secretary of the Treasury to succeed Douglas Dillon. Dillon will resign shortly.

Mar. 20—President Johnson names Carl E. Bagge and reappoints Charles R. Ross to the Federal Power Commission. He appoints John L. Sweeney as chairman of the Appalachian Commission.

Mar. 22—at a White House dinner, President Johnson entertains 42 state governors. They are briefed on national and international affairs.

Mar. 25—President Johnson appoints James J. Wadsworth to the Federal Communications Commission.

In a special message to Congress, President Johnson proposes that a regional development program be enacted, authorizing the federal government to allocate loans and grants totaling \$510 million annually in areas of high unemployment and low income.

Mar. 29—Two examiners of the Interstate Commerce Commission recommend a merger of the New York Central with the

Pennsylvania Railroad. The new Pennsylvania-N.Y. Central Transportation Co. would operate in the District of Columbia, 14 states and Canada, encompassing 19,631 miles of track. The examiners' report declares that the new road should take over the freight operations of the bankrupt New Haven Railroad but not its passenger service.

Mar. 30—The House Committee on Un-American Activities votes to investigate the Ku Klux Klan.

Mar. 31—The trustees of the New Haven Railroad announce that they will join with the new line to be formed by the proposed merger of the New York Central and Pennsylvania Railroads. They will press "for elimination of all passenger service," provided by the New Haven for New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Massachusetts. If satisfactory arrangements with "public authorities can be made," the New York Central and Pennsylvania will continue the passenger service.

Labor

Mar. 8—Longshoremen return to work after ratifying new contracts over the weekend in all South Atlantic and Gulf ports, except for Mobile and New Orleans where agreement was previously approved. The strike by the International Longshoremen's Association, which began on January 11, 1965, ends.

Mar. 9—Negotiations between the 11 large steel companies and the United Steelworkers of America resume after 2 months.

Longshoremen in Port Everglades and Miami strike after refusing to accept the new contract.

Mar. 16—George Meany, president of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, accuses the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions' staff of receiving "hidden income" and threatens to withdraw A.F.L.-C.I.O. membership from the group. (See also *Intl. I.C.F.T.U.*)

Mar. 22—A new contract between the

United Steelworkers of America and the American Can Company is announced: a 10¢ an hour wage increase and additional pension benefits are provided.

Mar. 27—The United Steelworkers of America and the Continental Can Company sign a new contract providing for a 12¢ hourly wage increase.

Military

Mar. 21—Ranger 9 is successfully launched to take additional pictures of the moon.

Mar. 23—The Gemini 3 successfully orbits the earth 3 times with 2 astronauts aboard, Major Virgil I. Grissom and Lieutenant Commander John W. Young. Major Grissom fires rockets to alter the plane and shape of the ship's orbit and is able to steer the spacecraft somewhat during reentry into the earth's atmosphere. It is the first U.S. test of a 2-man space flight.

Mar. 24—Ranger 9 hits the moon with great precision near the center of the Alphonsus crater. It sends back over 5,800 pictures of the lunar surface.

Mar. 30—It is reported that the chief of the National Guard Bureau announced regulations earlier this month to the Army and Air National Guards to eliminate racial discrimination. National Guard units in any state discriminating against Negroes will lose federal support.

Segregation

Mar. 5—The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King meets with President Johnson for over an hour; they discuss the proposed bill to eliminate discrimination in voter registration. (See also *U.S. Government*.)

In Texas, District Judge Herman Jones signs an order nullifying 11 state laws requiring segregated education.

In Indianola, Mississippi, a freedom school and library are burned following a demonstration and school boycott led by COFO (Council of Federated Organizations).

Mar. 6—The Rev. Joseph Ellwanger of Birmingham, white pastor of a Lutheran Church for Negroes, leads 70 white Ala-

bamans into Selma in support of the Negro voter registration drive.

Mar. 7—Alabama state troopers and volunteer officers of the Dallas County Sheriff's office use tear gas, night sticks and whips to block over 500 civil rights demonstrators setting out on a protest march from Selma to Montgomery. Governor George C. Wallace has prohibited the march.

Mar. 9—Federal District Judge Frank Johnson, Jr., early this morning, issues an injunction against a Selma to Montgomery march, and schedules a hearing for March 11 on the Negroes' complaint against the prohibition of such a march. King leads some 1,500 Negroes and whites on a protest march from Selma to Montgomery. They proceed for 1 mile and turn back when confronted by state troopers.

Mar. 10—The Justice Department files a complaint in a Federal District Court in Montgomery against interference by state and city officials with "lawful peaceable demonstrations in behalf of the rights of Negroes" or with persons attempting to register to vote.

In Selma, demonstrators sleep and pray in the street near Brown's Chapel Methodist Church, where the marches originate.

Three white men are arrested for last night's attack and injury to white Unitarian minister James J. Reeb of Boston. Reeb and two other ministers were attacked after eating in a Negro restaurant in Selma.

Mar. 11—James Reeb dies in a Birmingham hospital.

U. S. Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach announces that the Justice Department will prosecute state and local officials who violated federal law in their brutal suppression of civil rights marchers on March 7.

Mar. 13—Governor Wallace and President Johnson meet in Washington.

Later, at a news conference with Wallace present, Johnson asserts that law and order must be maintained in Alabama. If local and state governments cannot maintain

peace, the federal government will assume responsibility.

Leon Ameer, a possible successor to the slain Malcolm X, is found dead in a Boston hotel room.

Mar. 14—Governor Wallace declares that he will allow a Selma to Montgomery march only if there is a final court ruling to that effect.

Mar. 15—Mrs. Ella Collins, half-sister to Malcolm X, assumes the leadership of his Organization of Afro-American Unity.

Mar. 16—At a news conference, King praises the Administration's voting bill but declares that demonstrations must continue to "keep the issue alive."

Mar. 17—Federal District Judge Frank Johnson, Jr., issues an injunction to Governor Wallace and other state authorities against interference with the march from Selma to Montgomery. State officers are ordered to give full police protection to the marchers. Judge Johnson declares he has approved the demonstrators' plans.

Mar. 18—The Court of Appeals (highest New York state court) affirms a decision by the Appellate Division upholding the Commissioner of Education's authority to direct Malverne, L. I., to correct racial imbalance in one of its schools.

Mar. 19—Governor Wallace, in a telegram to President Johnson, states that Alabama is too poor to mobilize the National Guard to protect marchers and that protection will have to be provided at federal expense.

Mar. 20—President Johnson mobilizes "selected units of the Alabama National Guard," a force of 1,863, to help protect the civil rights march on Montgomery beginning tomorrow. Johnson also makes other units available.

Mar. 21—Some 3,200 civil rights marchers, led by Martin Luther King, leave Selma for Montgomery via Highway 80. Army and National Guard units are on hand to direct the traffic.

In Birmingham, Alabama, 4 time bombs, each with 40 to 50 sticks of dynamite, are found at a Negro funeral parlor, a Negro

Roman Catholic Church, the all-Negro Western High School, and a Negro lawyer's home. They are deactivated.

Mar. 25—King, and the 300 Negroes who made the 5-day 54-mile walk to Montgomery from Selma, march on the Alabama state capitol as the journey ends. They are joined by some 25,000 persons, including a number of white Southerners. Governor Wallace is not available to receive the marchers' petition for freedom now, equal protection of the law and an end to police brutality.

Mrs. Viola Gregg Liuzzo of Detroit, Michigan, is shot and killed on Highway 80 by occupants of another car while driving Selma-Montgomery marchers home.

Mar. 26—In Birmingham, Alabama, 4 members of the Ku Klux Klan are arrested in connection with the slaying of Viola Liuzzo. They are charged with the federal crime of conspiring to violate her civil rights.

In a special television broadcast, President Johnson tells Klansmen to withdraw from the Klan. He threatens to present a bill to regulate the Ku Klux Klan and suggests that Congress investigate this "hooded society of bigots."

The Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., calls President Johnson a "damn liar."

Mar. 28—St. Paul's Episcopal Church in Selma admits 4 Negroes to services for the first time.

King, on a television program, proposes a national economic boycott of Alabama products.

Mar. 31—A Wall Street investment banking house, in a letter to Governor Wallace, declares that it will no longer buy or sell bonds issued by Alabama's state or municipal agencies.

Supreme Court

Mar. 1—The Supreme Court refuses to review an appeals court decision that the Constitution, while prohibiting segregation,

does not dictate school integration. The case was brought by parents of Negro children, protesting *de facto* school segregation arising from housing patterns and school district lines.

Mar. 8—The Supreme Court upholds the right of the Justice Department to sue the state of Mississippi to protect Negro voting rights. It also rules that a Louisiana voter registration test has been administered so as to discriminate against Negroes; the Court declares unconstitutional the Louisiana statute requiring applicants registering to vote to take a test on constitutional interpretation.

The Supreme Court rules that 3 young men are exempt from combat training and service on the basis of a personal religious commitment that dictates conscientious objection to military service. According to the Court, the test of the validity of religious belief "is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption."

Mar. 29—The Supreme Court declares that an employer may close his business completely to avoid union organization by employees. However, a partial closing, shutting down a particular plant, is an unfair labor practice if the object of the closing is to "chill unionism in any of the remaining plants." The case is sent back to the National Labor Relations Board to determine the purpose of the 1956 closing of the Darlington (South Carolina) plant and its effect on other textile employees in the Deering Milliken mills.

In a second labor case, the Court rules that a multi-employer group may lock out its employees in response to a whipsaw strike and hire temporary replacements. In a whipsaw strike, workers strike only some of the concerns in a multi-employer group.

In a third labor case, the Court rules that an employer may lock out his em-

ployees in order to resist union demands.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH

- Mar. 1—Premier Phan Hay Quat declares, in a proclamation, that the war in Vietnam must continue until North Vietnam ends its aggression and infiltration.
- Mar. 3—Some 30 U.S. Air Force jets attack secret targets. It is believed that they are bombing sections of the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos, which serves as a supply route from North to South Vietnam.

The Armed Forces Council elects Major General Nguyen Van Thieu as secretary general of the Council. He replaces Lieutenant General Nguyen Khanh, who served as chairman of the council.

- Mar. 6—The U.S. Pentagon announces that 2 more battalions of marines, over 3,500 men, will be sent to South Vietnam as combat troops at the request of the South Vietnamese government. They will be stationed near Danang, a jet bomber base.

Vietcong (pro-Communist) rebels battle with some 1,200 Vietnamese soldiers some 40 miles southwest of Danang.

U.S. helicopters airlift Vietnamese forces to assist besieged government troops. Artillery halts the Vietcong advance.

- Mar. 13—U.S. President Johnson declares that a negotiated settlement is not possible until North Vietnam ends its aggression. He reaffirms the U.S. commitment to defend Southeast Asia.

- Mar. 15—U.S. Air Force jets and Navy bombers bomb an ammunition depot in North Vietnam 100 miles south of Hanoi.

- Mar. 19—Over 110 U.S. planes bomb 2 targets in North Vietnam.

U.S. officials in Washington confirm that the U.S. has used napalm bombs against North Vietnam.

- Mar. 21—South Vietnamese bombers accompanied by U.S. Air Force planes attack Vucon, a North Vietnamese supply depot and staging barracks. Some 40 buildings are hit.

- Mar. 22—Armed U.S. planes on a route reconnaissance mission in North Vietnam

attack a radar station 60 miles within North Vietnam.

- Mar. 23—The Soviet government declares that Soviet citizens have volunteered to fight in Vietnam for the Vietcong.
- Mar. 25—An editorial in *Jenmin Jih Pao* (Chinese Communist party organ) declares that Red China is willing to send men and arms to fight in South Vietnam against U.S. "aggressors" whenever the South Vietnamese so desire.

- Mar. 28—It is reported that 12 destroyers and minesweepers from the U.S. Seventh Fleet are patrolling the South Vietnamese coast. Air patrol is also providing surveillance against possible North Vietnamese supply ships en route to the Vietcong rebels.

- Mar. 30—A 250-pound bomb explodes in front of the U.S. embassy in Saigon. Two Americans and 11 Vietnamese are killed and 150 are wounded.

- Mar. 31—Over 70 U.S. jet planes bomb Vietcong rebels in an area 25 miles northwest of Saigon. South Vietnamese and U.S. planes bomb radar installations in North Vietnam.

YEMEN

- Mar. 8—A U.S. State Department spokesman declares that the U.S. will ship surplus food to royalist-held areas, if "procedural difficulties" can be resolved.

- Mar. 24—Royalist forces take control of the republican stronghold at Harib.

YUGOSLAVIA

- Mar. 11—It is reported that Mihajlo Mihajlov, a scholar who has written critical articles on the Yugoslav government, has been arrested.

- Mar. 13—in Belgrade a surprise meeting of nonaligned nations, called by President Tito, opens to discuss Vietnam.



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